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# **The Impact of Rising Social Intolerance on Access to Public Services and Civil Liberties in Indonesia**

**Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy,  
Paramadina Foundation (PUSAD Paramadina)**

**June 2023**

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*Cover photo: A mother and her child receive health care at a Posyandu (Village Integrated Health Post) in one of USAID MADANI's pilot locations in Boyolali District, Central Java. (Image: Danumurthi Mahendra/USAID MADANI)*

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALIA	Family Love Alliance ( <i>Aliansi Cinta Keluarga</i> )
BPS	Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik)
CSO	Civil society organization
DPR	The Indonesian parliament ( <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> )
FPI	The Islamic Defenders Front ( <i>the Front Pembela Islam</i> )
HTI	<i>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</i>
ID	Identity ( <i>Kartu Tanda Penduduk-KTP</i> )
JAI	Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community ( <i>Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia</i> )
Jilbab	Islamic headscarf
KUHP	Criminal Code ( <i>Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana</i> )
Kyai	Male Islamic preacher
LGBTQ	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or questioning
LSI	Lembaga Survey Indonesia
MoE	Margin of Error
OIRE/PHSC	FHI 360 Office of International Research Ethics/Protection of Human Subjects Committee
<i>Pesantren</i>	Islamic boarding school
<i>Perda</i>	Local regulation ( <i>Peraturan Daerah</i> )
Polri	Indonesian National Police ( <i>Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> )
<i>PUSAD Paramadina</i>	Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy, Paramadina Foundation ( <i>Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina</i> )
<i>Raperda</i>	Draft local regulation ( <i>Rancangan Peraturan Daerah</i> )
<i>RT</i>	Neighborhoods making up a RW ( <i>Rukun Tetangga</i> )
<i>RW</i>	Hamlets making up a village ( <i>Rukun Warga</i> )
SUSENAS	National Socio-Economic ( <i>Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional</i> )
TNI	Indonesia Armed Forces ( <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> )
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
<i>Waria</i>	A transgender person

# 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While sufficient attention has been given to the problems of both increasing religious intolerance and decreasing universal access to public services and civil liberties in Indonesia, the relationship between the two remains a puzzle. Efforts to understand the dynamics between the two so far have been hampered by conceptual and practical issues, given the vastness of the issues raised. The overall objective of this national study is to capture if and under what conditions social intolerance in Indonesia impacts universal access to essential public services (i.e., educational subsidies, population services, healthcare and social protection services), as well as civil liberties (i.e., the right to assembly and the right to free expression). We distinguish religious intolerance from religious conservatism, as the former is concerned more with whether fundamental social and political rights should apply to religious groups other than one's own, and the latter is concerned more with supporting public policies that include social regulations.

This study used quantitative data collection in mid-2022 through a national survey of 3,880 respondents in all 34 provinces of Indonesia, including an oversampling in USAID's eight priority provinces: Banten, East Java, East Nusa Tenggara, Jakarta, North Sumatra, Papua, South Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan. Eighty-seven percent of respondents are Muslim. This study also collected qualitative data from 82 key informants' in-depth interviews and case studies in 12 locations. This approach allows the study to explore social intolerance's relationship to the real-life context of discrimination or social exclusion in public services.

If we start with degrees of tolerance, in line with other studies (e.g., Mujani 2019; LSI 2019 and 2023), our survey found a substantial degree of intolerance in Indonesia in the religious-political dimension. We define religious-political intolerance as opposition or hostility toward other religious expressions exercising their socio-political rights, or negative attitudes, stereotypes, and resistance to social interactions with religious outgroups (Gibson 2010, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, Sumaktoyo 2020, Dunn and Singh 2014).<sup>1</sup> Among Muslims, the greatest opposition was to non-Muslims becoming public officials: 59 percent do not want non-Muslims to become regional heads in Muslim-majority regions, and 50.1 percent think non-Muslims should not become community leaders (*Rukun Tetangga/Rukun Warga* [RT/RW] heads) in their neighborhoods. Those who think non-Muslims should not protest against discrimination are also high (49 percent).

In terms of spill-over to public service, the picture is more complex. Among Muslim respondents, on average only 2.1 percent believe that Muslims should receive some priority when accessing a variety of public services, 5.2 percent believe that Shiites and Ahmadis should receive less priority than those not affiliated with those sects, and 1.8 percent agree that women who wear a jilbab headscarf must receive priority over women who do not wear a jilbab when accessing public services.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In measuring religious tolerance, we opted for a broad approach, asking respondents about the extent to which they are willing to respect the rights of religious outgroups on various issues.

<sup>2</sup> This reflects Muslim respondents' opinions about the prioritization of public services by religious groups (that Shiites and Ahmadists should receive less priority than those who are not Shia/Ahmadiyya when accessing

When it comes to personal experience with public service access, 5.1 percent of all respondents perceived that the process of applying for an ID card is discriminative and 13.1 percent reported that the process of applying for an educational subsidy for poor students is discriminatory (Figure 10 on page 20). However, the main reason for discrimination was economic status and not religion or ethnicity (see below). The survey did nevertheless find high discriminative attitudes against women, a trait often associated with Islamic conservatism. 60.7 percent of all respondents (63 percent male respondents) agree that women who visit government offices should be required to wear the headscarf and dress modestly; 58.6 percent (60.5 percent male respondents) agree that there should be a rule that prohibits male healthcare workers (doctors and nurses) from treating female patients; and 53.4 percent (53.6 percent male respondents) agree that there should be a rule banning women from working at night. Twenty-nine percent agreed that male and female students should be taught in separate classrooms. Even though only 1.8 percent felt that *jilbab*-wearing women should be prioritized in accessing the public services, this could mean that Muslim women are not prioritized even if they follow religious and moral norms. The impact is not only suffered by non-Muslim women but also by Muslim women, as they are forced to adhere to a single (conservative) interpretation of Islamic religious provisions. Women are currently shying away from protesting such policies for fear of social disapproval and even criminalization on social media.

Our study found that, among the respondents who perceived discrimination in access to ID cards or educational subsidies, economic status was the most cited reason for discrimination (79.5 percent) (Figure 12 on page 22), and not religion or ethnicity. Public services are considered more accessible to those who have money or contacts. This aligns with other studies (e.g., Rahmi et al. 2020) showing that economic reasons are the most common discriminators for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. However, non-Muslim respondents are more likely to cite other reasons, such as ethnicity and religion. This suggests that Muslims and non-Muslims may have different experiences of discrimination. According to Peterman (2018), discrimination based on socio-economic status often reinforces and perpetuates other forms of inequality. Rahmi et al. (2020) identified three layers of structural barriers that individuals face when dealing with public services: (1) when individuals lack access due to poverty, remoteness, and immobility; (2) when individuals deal with services that are unresponsive to their specific needs or situations; and (3) when individuals experience discrimination due to their social identities, such as gender, religion, and ethnicity. Our case studies in Cirebon and Tasikmalaya found a similar link between economic status and discrimination. For example, while not necessarily impacting certain minority groups, the implementation of local bylaws, such as those on morality, affects the lower middle class, such as nightlife workers. We also suspect an interplay between economic factors and several other factors, which will be discussed further below.

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public services). Interestingly, when the question was set into a hypothetical scenario, whether people would be more supportive of discriminative policies if the policies are framed as government efforts to follow the aspiration of society and religious leaders, the levels of support for discriminative policies was quite considerable. About 26 percent would support a policy that prefers Muslim students to non-Muslim students in education subsidy; 28 percent a policy that advocates denying Shiites and Ahmadists access to civil registration services (see page 34-35).

Detailed disaggregation found that support for political Islam and level of religious observance are the two key variables associated with level of intolerance:

- Respondents who support political Islam show more agreement with restrictive attitudes toward women accessing public services.
- Respondents who perceived that public services were discriminative tend to agree with restrictive attitudes toward women accessing public services.
- Intolerance and support for political Islam are positively correlated with a preference for prioritizing women wearing a headscarf over women not wearing a headscarf in accessing public services.
- Intolerance and a higher level of religious observance are positively correlated with a preference for prioritizing non-heterodox Islamic sects over the so-called heterodox groups (i.e., Shiites and Ahmadis) in accessing public services.
- A stronger belief in Muslim religious norms and values is positively correlated with a preference for prioritizing Muslims over non-Muslims in accessing public services.

The pervasive influence of support for political Islam on public policy is sustained by the symbiosis between politicians and conservative groups during and between elections, a process sometimes referred to as “institutionalized discrimination” that occurs beneath the surface and is often not captured by surveys or indices. This includes discrimination or favoritism in policy and everyday practices (beyond access to basic public services). These forms of systemic or micro-discrimination are partly enabled by regional autonomy and an electoral system that encourages national and local political actors to win majority support by leaving minority groups behind. Our study found that support for discriminatory policies against women is considerable. As such, we cannot determine whether our findings reflect that access to public services is indeed inclusive or whether the public discourse on this particular issue is simply absent. It is also possible that people are timid to report discrimination or that the discrimination happens in another, invisible layer.

One topic related to freedoms of assembly on which there is a high level of intolerance is the construction of non-Muslim houses of worship in one’s neighborhood. Almost half of the total respondents (49.1 percent) oppose other religions’ places of worship being built (see Figure 2 on page 15). This figure is similar to the LSI surveys in 2019 and 2023, which have tracked an increase in this trend since 2017. 18.2 percent of Muslim respondents oppose having non-Muslims in their neighborhoods. This aligns with the findings of the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (*Survey Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional*, or SUSENAS) as well as the Indonesian Family Life Survey (see for example Yusuf AA, et al. 2020).

An oversampling in eight USAID priority provinces allowed us to make statistically significant comparisons between those regions. The study found geographic variations in religious intolerance, in restrictive attitudes toward women, in stances on mosque loudspeakers, in acceptance of government discrimination, and in acceptability of discussing sensitive topics publicly. These variations are likely related to the composition of religious groups or the relations between religious groups in these provinces. The Muslim-majority provinces of Banten, Jakarta, East Java and South Sulawesi showed the highest levels of intolerance, the most acceptance of government discrimination, and the most restrictive attitudes toward discussing sensitive topics. In contrast, in mixed provinces, Muslims tend to have lower levels of intolerance, acceptance of government discrimination, and restrictions on freedom of

expression. Nevertheless, regarding restrictive attitudes toward women, all provinces tend to be similar, whether Muslim-majority, mixed, or non-Muslim-majority.

However, there are also variations between provinces where Muslims are a minority. For example, compared to other regions, minority Muslims in East Nusa Tenggara are more likely to consider criticism of the government off-limits. Muslims are also most resistant to complaints about mosque loudspeakers in places where they are a minority, such as East Nusa Tenggara and Papua. This implies that tensions or sensitivities around this issue are high in these areas. In other Muslim-majority provinces, such as East Java, Muslims tend to be more relaxed about complaints about mosque loudspeakers.

While our one-off survey does not enable us to capture trends, our findings align with the trends noted in other studies (LSI 2019 and LSI 2023). Among Muslims, most do not tolerate non-Muslims becoming public officials. Nearly 60 percent want non-Muslims to avoid becoming regional heads (i.e., mayors, regents, governors) in a Muslim-majority region. This resembles the finding in the recent LSI survey (2023), which has tracked an increase in this trend since 2016.

Regarding civil liberties, our survey found indications of self-censorship and hesitation to voice grievances or tolerate houses of worship from both the majority and minority communities alike, confirmed by the key informant interviews and case studies. This was apparent in the survey when respondents were asked about the mosque loudspeakers in people's neighborhoods. Only a few people complained about the volume when asked using direct questions. But when asked indirectly through a list experiment (see pages 46-48) more people complained about the volume. This suggests that people tend to conceal their actual view on this particular issue for reasons of communal harmony. We also asked who exactly could complain about the mosque's sound. Among Muslims themselves, only devout Muslims who regularly attend the mosque were considered legitimate to complain about the mosque's loudspeakers. Apart from them, complaints against mosque loudspeakers were deemed offensive. This strengthened the result of our qualitative study that shows some general mechanisms in which rising conservatism affected the narrowing of civil liberties, such as when under the pretext of defending Indonesia's pluralism, both state and non-state actors carry out threats and repression against individuals and groups they perceive to be dangerous.

We also found indications of support for the repression of freedom of speech. Of the six topics most often considered sensitive in previous surveys (communism, atheism, religious violence, LGBTQ [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning] rights, critiques toward government, and critiques toward the national armed forces and police), more than 70 percent of respondents supported banning discussions on communism, atheism, religious violence and LGBTQ (see Figure 22 on page 29). Banning criticism of the president or the armed forces was supported by 36 and 42 percent, respectively. Banning discussion is often justified under the pretext of defending pluralism and state ideology, as well as fighting hoaxes that are considered to threaten national unity and public order. This reminds of the increasing restrictions on free speech that we see in other countries around the world, such as discussions on monarchy in Thailand and "Don't Say Gay" in Florida.

In short, while the findings show that the magnitude of discriminative action in public services based on religion or ethnicity has not reached significant levels, a relatively high proportion of respondents report agreement on limiting women's roles in public spaces and tighter control by the state on freedom of expression by banning discourse on sensitive topics – and that these opinions are correlated with Islamic conservatism. These findings indicate that there is still much work to be done in Indonesia for gender equity and freedom of speech and expression.

It is also worth noting that the degree of discrimination seems to increase with the complexity of the issue. Applying for educational subsidies is more demanding than getting an ID card, and more respondents perceive discrimination. Intolerance is higher regarding the construction of non-Muslim houses of worship, rather than just living next to a non-Muslim. Intolerance is higher towards people of a different sexual orientation or ideology rather than of different faith. In short, if tolerance would imply acceptance towards all, even though you may be LGBTQ or criticize the government, we may conclude that many Indonesians are fairly intolerant, and perhaps increasingly so.

Nevertheless, the study also found that these forms of intolerance can be contained through community counter-narratives, legal action, media advocacy, or personal action to complain against intolerant service providers. The case studies (pages 47-56) reported some notable civil society activists' initiatives, for example, on keeping up the public's awareness and pressure against draconian rules such as the Law on Electronic Transaction and Information (*Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik*, UU ITE) and recently against revisions to the Criminal Code (KUHP), on how to co-exist and delegitimize discriminative local regulations (*Peraturan Daerah, Perda*) that have been passed in Cirebon, Tasikmalaya, Banjarmasin, and Pontianak, on working smartly and politically with local influencers (e.g., on transgender issues in Islamic boarding schools [*pesantren*] in Yogyakarta), on a legal battle against mandatory headscarf-wearing in Padang City, and against intolerance within the government's systems (e.g., the case of the Law on Advancement of Culture). However, interviews also found that civil society activists can face challenges in legitimacy if they do not remain independent from political interests.

## **2 BACKGROUND**

During the first decade after democratization in 1998, Indonesian power structures moved away from patronage networks to stronger interactions between citizens and the state, creating space for civil society to engage government and re-politicizing communities. However, local political life has stagnated over the past decade. Although spaces are still available (there has been no backsliding in civic space as in many other countries), democracy has not been able to deliver better services as promised, and the quality-of-service delivery in critical sectors (e.g., education, healthcare, water) lags in Indonesia.

The rise of intolerance and religious conservatism in Indonesia has exacerbated service delivery challenges (Regus, Tapung, and Jelahun, 2022). The 2020-2024 Medium-term National Development Plan states that Indonesia continues to have “a weak understanding and practice of religious values that are moderate, inclusive and tolerant in strengthening

religious harmony.” The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Religious Harmony Index shows a decline in tolerance from 75.36 in 2015 to 70.90 in 2018. The Setara Institute (2018) and the Wahid Institute (2015) also report increased incidents of religious intolerance in recent years, including denying access to education for religious minorities and local protests aimed at intimidating minority groups. The national elections in April 2019 also featured an intense campaign period, as political parties lobbied for voters’ support to gain a greater share of seats in the parliament. Just as in other countries, the campaign period saw a spike in the spread of disinformation and fake news, much of it linked to ethnicity, religion, and race, putting further tensions on communal tolerance and harmony. Pre-campaigning for the 2024 elections shows that identity politics and religious sentiments will continue to be driving forces, further exacerbating the strains on Indonesia’s inclusive democracy. We know from studies from other countries, including high-income countries, that access to certain “non-mainstream” services, such as tertiary education, leisure, and art, has been more challenging for vulnerable groups and populations exposed to prejudice (Djupe, 2015).

In addition, several recent national regulations might limit access to services for vulnerable populations. Proposed revisions to the draft Family Resilience Law and the newly approved Criminal Code (*Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana*, or KUHP) would reduce inclusivity. The Family Resilience Law introduces seriously questionable provisions that would discriminate against women and sexual and gender minorities. For example, it would ban contraceptives for non-married persons. Argama (2020) states that the revision to the Criminal Code “threatens basic rights, such as freedom of expression, while weakening law enforcement against human rights violations and corruption.” Sex outside marriage is declared a crime, and single men or women having contraceptives can be criminalized. Both the Family Resilience Law and the Criminal Code led to loud protests by civil society in September 2019.

Access to reproductive health services and HIV testing may be in danger. Those seeking such assistance are being stigmatized, and cultural and social pressures on them might spill over to families and surrounding communities. More broadly, a growing number of districts have adopted *Shari’a* by-laws, which potentially limit the freedoms of girls and women to access public services or ban alcohol (Buehler, 2018), even though, as we have seen in our study, actual implementation is limited, and access to public services is not regularly negatively affected.

As in many parts of the world, societal norms and public attitudes are changing in Indonesia, and “a new normal” is starting to emerge with populist and conservative norms that would have been marginal or extreme ten years ago. A new study on women in Indonesian elections concludes that “many Indonesians hold deeply patriarchal attitudes regarding women’s participation in politics.” Small groups of social conservatives and “primordialists” are successfully changing broader societal norms and turning them into a broader populism (Mietzner 2020). This might not have yet spilled over to the political sphere (the moderate Jokowi won the 2019 presidential election, and Islamic parties did not increase their votes). Still, recent studies have shown that increasing intolerance already affects access to public services: “These regional laws constituted violations of minorities’ constitutionally protected human rights to fair and equal access to public services” (Setara Institute 2019).

One of the main reasons protests against the revision of the Criminal Code and Family Law were so heated in 2019 was that deliberation on these bills was done with minimal

opportunities for contributions from civil society and the public. Civil society plays a crucial role in guarding Indonesia’s historical democratic momentum. At its best, civil society is a bulwark against the abuse of public or private power and a space where alternative solutions to social problems can be developed and debated. Civil society groups can do this by building bridges across the lines of class, race, and gender and addressing their internal challenges of governance, accountability, and values-based action.

There are, however, civil society organizations that are beginning to threaten liberal democracy, sometimes referred to as “uncivil society” (Beitinger-Lee 2010). During the past decade, a rise of radical religious, vigilante, and para-military groups disguised as civic associations – offering shortcuts and quick fixes to the perceived failings of modern society – have become a threat to mainstream democratic values.

The shrinking civic space in Indonesia might thus not only be related to state actions limiting public freedoms but also to the social media interactions and protests of small but vocal radical groups who disagree with the moderate and inclusive agenda of progressives. Increasing conservatism should not be confused with widespread opposition to democracy, and there remains strong support for democracy and regional autonomy in Indonesia. But the voices and actions of community-based conservative groups are starting to negatively influence the civic space by mainstreaming what were in the past quite extreme attitudes and practices.

While our understanding of the state of religious intolerance, civic space, and universal public service in the post-Suharto era is relatively adequate (see, for example, Brinkerhoff [2013], Prasojo [2018]; Sumaktoyo [2018]), there is a substantial gap of knowledge on the relationship between these three issues. Given varied socio-cultural contexts in decentralized Indonesia, a study on these relationships will require a robust design that is not only technically sound but also politically and operationally feasible. In this regard, this study is needed to:

1. Clarify certain theoretical aspects of the relationships between the rising religious intolerance in Indonesia, universal access to essential public services, and civic space, as well as how local civil society can counter these tendencies.
2. Gather empirical evidence of the relationships between the rising religious intolerance, provision of and access to public services, and shrinking civic space.
3. Understand the remaining knowledge gaps within policy and practice contexts.

## **2.1 Study Goals and Objectives**

The study aimed to capture how rising intolerance in Indonesia impacts universal access to essential public services (educational subsidies and population services) and civil liberties (i.e., the right to assembly and the right to free expression). Considering that the events, opinions, behaviors, and other phenomena related to intolerance do not generally remain stagnant, the study was designed to collect repeated measures from the same sample at different points in time in early 2022 and 2023. Due to a change in USAID’s priorities in the program, namely giving priority to intensifying practices of collaborative governance, MADANI decided to cancel the second round of data collection.

The analysis was intended to inform our understanding of the magnitude of the impact of social intolerance on citizen's access to public services and civil liberties in Indonesia as well as recommendations on the following:

- How do the impacts vary by different factors (age/sex/education/religion/geographic area)?
- What factors are associated with decreasing/increasing access to public services or civil liberties?
- What factors independently predict/cause an observed decrease/increase in access to public services or civil liberties?
- What initiatives work and do not work in containing the impact of intolerance?

From September 2020 to March 2021, MADANI supported PUSAD Paramadina in carrying out a scoping study on the impact of intolerance on universal access to basic public services (Ali-Fauzi et al. 2021). This initial phase was submitted to FHI 360's Office of International Research Ethics/Protection of Human Subjects Committee (OIRE/PHSC) and determined to be research but exempted from further review (Category 2iii and Exemption Category 4). Part of the task of the scoping study was to provide methodological options for the larger national study, including how to guide the development of a questionnaire to investigate the empirical manifestations of intolerance on the provision of and access to public services.

The initial scoping study survey – limited to 120 households in six districts in West Kalimantan and West Java provinces – found a positive correlation between increasing social intolerance and reduced access to education, health, and population services. The study found that religious conservatism was positively correlated with support for narrowing universal access to public services in the two provinces. This was seen, for instance, through perceptions of restrictive attitudes toward women accessing public services and that Muslims should be given priority over non-Muslims in accessing public service.

The scoping study highlighted the need for more extensive, mixed-methodology research using the following dimensions and variables (to be further elaborated in the next section):

- Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics
- Religiosity
- Political/Ideological Preference
- Religious Intolerance
- Social and Political Intolerance
- Restrictive Public Service Provision/Environment
- Types of Social Exclusion Experienced in Public Service
- Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Speech, and General Respect for Democratic Rights

Surveys help gather information at the individual level, such as individual experiences, attitudes, and opinions, as well as compare experiences in public service delivery among individuals with different backgrounds. However, more than a survey is needed to capture or make sense of the impact of social intolerance on access to services or civic liberties.


Alternative methods to measure levels of intolerance and discrimination on the part of public service providers are needed.

Furthermore, categorizing a public policy as “discriminative” must be investigated and justified by carefully determined standards. Learning from the experience of previous studies, setting this standard can be very complex. Budget analysis of local government spending can be used to see whether it allocates more money toward intolerant/discriminative agendas (e.g., local regulations on religious schools, religious monuments, favoritism in social aid distributions, and other political gimmicks), which distort spending on public services, or whether basic services are implemented in an unfair or discriminative way (e.g., distributing education scholarships to specific groups only). Experimental studies examining how public service providers would react to particular scenarios can also be carried out to provide more conclusive evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship.

## 2.2 Conceptual Framework

For the above reasons, our current study employed a conceptual framework described in Figure 1. The framework acknowledges that social intolerance could be demonstrated by the state or among society members in various domains, from policy, public services, social norms, and societal neglect. This study covers the manifestation of intolerance in both domains, vertical and horizontal intolerance.

**Figure 1: Measuring the influence of social intolerance on civil rights and liberties in Indonesia.**



### **3 METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Study Setting**

This study used quantitative data collection through a national survey in 34 provinces of Indonesia, including an oversampling in USAID's eight priority provinces: Banten, East Java, East Nusa Tenggara, Jakarta Special Capital Region (DKI), North Sumatra, Papua, South Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan.

This study also collected qualitative data from key informants' in-depth interviews and case studies in 12 locations. These locations were purposively selected based on the following criteria: (1) assumed level of intolerance; (2) assumed quality of public service; and (3) our existing knowledge and the availability of a network of researchers with a qualified skill set required for this study and district profile. Following the Government of Indonesia's protocols for dealing with COVID-19, we limited our field work to the areas declared safe by the government. Based on the above considerations and consultation with MADANI, we selected eight provinces for the case studies with details as follows: West Java (4 districts/cities), West Kalimantan (2 districts/cities), South Kalimantan (1 city), DI Yogyakarta (1 city), Banten (1 city), DKI Jakarta (1 city), East Java (1 city) and West Sumatra (2 cities). The increased sample size will allow us to compare geographically among these eight provinces.

#### **3.2 Design and Methodology**

As part of the quantitative study, between March and August 2022, we surveyed 3,880 respondents living in urban and rural parts of Indonesia. The respondents consisted of 1,940 males and 1,940 females (for a more detailed respondent breakdown by demographic characteristics, see Annex 2). The number of respondents in each province was determined proportionally according to their population except in MADANI's eight priority provinces where oversampling was done to enable provincial-level analysis. For the oversampled provinces, we collected 390 respondents in each province. This oversampling ensures that each province's margin-of-error (MOE) would not exceed  $\pm 5\%$ . The national MOE ( $n=1200$ ) was  $\pm 2.83$  percent, while the oversampled provinces MOE was  $\pm 1.58\%$ . The questionnaire comprised 58 primary questions and was developed after completing a literature review, scoping study, and pre-testing. The complete questionnaire is available as Annex 1.

The targeted survey respondents were aged 17 or older who lived in an urban or rural area and had accessed public services three months before being surveyed. The sample was drawn with multistage random sampling and proportionally distributed across Indonesia's 34 provinces in both urban and rural areas and randomized using the Kish grid method at the household level. The smallest sampling unit was a village (or *kelurahan*) with a maximum of 10 respondents. The respondents were then proportionally sampled according to gender, with a 50:50 ratio in each sampling location.

To ensure the quality of the data, we employed three quality control methods: spot-checks, direct witnesses, and callbacks. We conducted two rounds of spot-checks, one round of direct local witnesses, and one round of random callbacks to ensure the survey data collected was of the highest quality. The spot-checks were done by randomly selecting data entries from

each enumerator as a sample and listening to the entire audio recording of those entries. The separate and independent local witnesses also went to the randomly selected village in each of the 34 provinces to ensure the interview took place in the designated area. Callbacks were performed on 20 percent of the interviewed respondents by spot-check officers.

Meanwhile, as part of the qualitative data collection (key informant in-depth interviews/expert consultations and case studies), we interviewed 54 men and 28 women, including transwomen, from various groups (35 activists from CSOs and universities, 15 government officials, 11 experts/academicians, and 21 community members). The case study approach was selected because in the context of non-confrontational norms in Indonesia, surveying opinion and attitude related to social tolerance among individuals can often capture normative aspirations instead of respondents' authentic responses.

## **4 KEY FINDINGS: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

At the start of this study, we conducted a literature review and interviews with 41 experts and practitioners inside and outside civil society. Below we report some insights from these sources that we find valuable for the overall discussion of the findings of this study.

### **4.1 Trends in Conservatism**

Indonesian observers (e.g., van Bruinessen 2013; Fealy 2006 and 2019, Bourchier 2019) believe there has been a “conservative turn” in mainstream Islam in Indonesia since 2005. Bruinessen uses “conservative Islam” to refer to “the various currents that reject modernist, liberal, or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and social order.” In his observation, conservatives “notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture” (Bruinessen 2013, 16).

This conservative turn in Indonesian politics was precipitated by the waning influence of progressive Islam and the strengthening of the influence of conservative Islam under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). His administration's reliance on the support of conservative Muslims led his government to make many concessions to political Islam, represented by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), so much so, argues historian Merle Ricklefs, that “it became less a case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: religious dynamics shaping the political regime” (Ricklefs, quoted in Bourchier 2019: 720). Since then, the trend towards conservatism has continued – for example, with the passing of the Anti-Pornography and Porno Action Law in 2008 and, more importantly, with the Constitutional Court's validation of the blasphemy law in 2010, which blurred “the boundaries between state and conservative Islam” and helped to “transform Indonesia into an overtly religious state” (Bourchier 2019: 721).

In the last few years, political processes at the national level have again enhanced Muslim conservatism. When Islamists gained popularity in late 2016 over the blasphemy case against then Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or Ahok, who is Christian-Chinese, it crystallized the nationwide mobilization for political Islam (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018). This

affected the national sentiment prior to the 2019 presidential election and pushed the incumbent President Jokowi to select Ma'ruf Amin, a profoundly conservative Muslim leader and former Head of MUI, as his running mate to strengthen his Islamic credentials. Following his success in the election, Jokowi's public policies have been characterized by its inclination toward Muslim majoritarianism (IPAC 2020; Bourchier 2019).

## **4.2 Trends in Intolerance**

The level of tolerance among Indonesian people is not that different from people in other similar countries (Menchik and Trost 2018). Intolerance appears to be high among Indonesians regarding specific issues, such as the construction of non-Muslim houses of worship in their neighborhood (50% of respondents in the 2009 Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey [Survey Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional or SUSENAS] said they would object) (BPS 2014).

The Religious Harmony Index published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs reported that the tolerance level decreased from 75.36 in 2015 to 70.90 in 2018 on a scale of 100. Of the three dimensions measured by the index (tolerance, cooperation, and equality), the "cooperation" dimension is always rated the highest, while "tolerance" is always the lowest.

Another study (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2019) saw a sharp increase in intolerance in 2017 when the mass protest against Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (who was accused of committing religious blasphemy) was in full swing. They found no significant increase in intolerance before the massive demonstration. They argue that, in this case, intolerance was mobilized rather than being a mobilizing factor. This is reminiscent of Giovanni Sartori's influential argument in 1969 that "the use of divisive rhetoric that politicizes social divisions can have an impact on perceived threats and increase levels of intolerance in society" (Sartori, quoted in Sumaktoyo 2017). Hamid (2018) noted that as the public sphere is increasingly filled with monolithic, conservative, and exclusive Muslim narratives, intolerance seems to have become a daily reality in Indonesia today.

## **4.3 Discrimination and Barriers to Public Services**

In the Indonesian Democracy Index, the "freedom from discrimination" score is consistently above 80 (a fairly good score), and the trend is that the score continues to rise. Representatives from the Index said they did not find many discrimination cases at the surface level (reported by mass media/expert panels). The only decline in this score occurred in 2012, when it decreased by four points. This was due to several community-based actions and threats from radical Islamic groups and discriminatory regulations made by the government. But there were no details in the Index on what cases or regulations were of concern.

The literature indicates that Indonesians are generally satisfied with the quality of frontline public services. Lewis and Pattinasarany (2009) noted that one large survey found that 78 percent, 90 percent, and 85 percent of respondents were at least somewhat satisfied with the quality of local administrative, health, and education services, respectively. The low demand of citizens for quality public services is thought to have contributed to "the lack of downward accountability at the local level in Indonesia" (Lewis 2014).

Nevertheless, many experts we consulted said there had been an “institutionalization of discrimination” through various instruments. This institutionalization can be seen in policies (e.g., local regulations, allocation of regional budgets) and practices (e.g., favoritism in recruiting civil servants and discriminatory practices in service delivery). They believe this institutionalization of discrimination is made possible by the decentralized electoral system, which encourages local political actors to consolidate power to continue winning competitive elections for grassroots positions and political offices. As a result, local governments increasingly tend to implement policies that are popular with the majority of their constituents. When the majority of citizens are increasingly intolerant, the policies taken tend to indulge that intolerance.

#### **4.4 How Conservatism and Intolerance Can Affect Access to Public Services**

Conservatism and intolerance can affect access to public services through a symbiosis of conservative politicians and conservative organizations. Buehler (2016) and Berenschot, Hanani, and Sambodho (2018), for example, highlighted the role of Islamic organizations as political brokers. Politicians have courted radical para-military Islamic groups to mobilize community support and, in turn, these groups leverage these politicians to assert their supremacy over minority groups. This pattern can be seen in the case of discrimination and persecution against the Ahmadis in Tasikmalaya (Soedirgo 2008). If this entanglement between politicians and broker groups continues, the definition of which citizens should be served may also continue to narrow.

Politicians embrace these Islamic mass organizations because they are considered to have resources that can be used to mobilize support. As a result, these politicians, to some extent, have supported the implementation of *Shari'a*-based regulations proposed by these mass organizations.

An example of a symbiosis between politicians and increasingly religious conservative groups that affects access to public services for vulnerable groups can be found in the case of the persecution and discrimination against the Indonesian Ahmadi Community (*Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* [JAI]) in Tasikmalaya (Soedirgo 2018). The clientelistic governance structure in Tasikmalaya in which mass organizations have outsized political influence has made the targeting of the Ahmadis appealing to local politicians. According to Soedirgo (2018), “State actors will allow, or even actively participate in, the persecution of minority groups to gain or maintain the support of powerful brokers.” If the symbiosis of politicians and Islamic mass organizations continues to strengthen, and if the increasingly intolerant views of these mass organizations lead to a narrow definition of which citizens should be served, then there is a risk that state administrators will also apply this narrow viewpoint to public service delivery.

#### **4.5 How Conservatism and Intolerance Can Affect Civic Space and Civil Liberties**

There are at least five mechanisms linking rising conservatism and intolerance in Indonesia to narrowing civil liberties. First, under the pretext of defending pluralism, the state carried out repressive actions such as dissolving organizations deemed to threaten the state’s ideology (Pancasila), including Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Front Pembela Islam or the Islamic

Defenders Front (FPI), without the proper legal process (Fealy 2020; Mujani & Liddle 2021; Hamid and Gammon 2017). Unfortunately, this action gained widespread public support, even among certain CSOs working on democracy issues (Mietzner 2021; Nuraniyah 2020). Second, under the pretext of fighting hoaxes that are not firmly and measurably defined, both state and non-state actors carry out digital threats and repression to maintain Indonesia's ideology of 'unity in diversity' (Bhineka Tunggal Ika in Indonesian) (Setiawan 2020). Third, the rise of religious conservatism has resulted in the polarization of groups based on religion. One consequence is increased intolerance in matters of daily life, which can narrow civil liberties. For example, Muslims are recently often reluctant to say "Merry Christmas" to their (Christian) neighbors, as was commonly done previously, because it is considered religiously forbidden. Fourth, in the education sector, the rise of daily manifestations of religious conservatism has resulted in educators in schools limiting the opportunities and rights of students to explore and express their own beliefs. Fifth, a very conservative understanding of Islam in certain areas, such as West Sumatra, causes even state rules to counter intolerance to be rejected. This, among other things, causes efforts to resist conservatism to be perceived as disrespecting local traditions and threatening local wisdom.

## **5 KEY FINDINGS: NATIONAL SURVEY**

This section is divided into four parts. The first part provides an overview of the sample characteristics and the sample's representativeness to the population. Next, we discuss descriptive statistics about the state of exclusion and intolerance, followed by some highlights from USAID's eight priority provinces. Inferential statistics are then presented to identify factors associated with or predicting exclusion or discrimination, including some highlights from the experimental study on several topics of interest.

### **5.1 Sample Characteristics**

The survey sample did not differ significantly from the population regarding gender, age, religion, education, and regional distribution. The latest census (SP2020) conducted by the BPS (Statistics Indonesia) recorded that the male and female populations were 50.58 percent and 49.42 percent. In our survey, the sample size of men and women was 49.9 percent and 50.1 percent. Muslims are the largest religious group in the population, with around 87 percent (2020 Indonesian census or SP2010). The Muslim sample in our survey is 87.4 percent, and respondents from other religions make up the remaining 12.6 percent. By education, 17.8 percent of our sample graduated from middle school, 25.3 percent from high school, 7.2 percent from college or more, and the rest from primary school or below. Annex 2 further details the characteristics of our sample.

### **5.2 Overall State of Exclusion and Intolerance**

#### **Religious Intolerance**

Following standard questions on religious intolerance in other surveys (e.g., Mujani 2019; LSI 2019, LSI 2023), we asked the extent to which respondents oppose other religious groups in


exercising their socio-political rights (P28 in the Questionnaire, see Annex 1). Among Muslims, the most opposition is shown to non-Muslims becoming public officials (Figure 2). This provides an initial measurement of how tolerant the respondent is towards other religions: 59 percent do not want non-Muslims to become regional heads (i.e., mayors, regents, governors) in a Muslim-majority region; 50.1 percent think non-Muslims should not become neighborhood heads. The percentage of those who think non-Muslims should not protest discrimination is also relatively high (49 percent).

While more Muslims do not oppose other religious groups organizing religious worship in their neighborhood, almost half (49.1 percent) oppose other religions' building houses of worship in their neighborhood. Of all the statements, Muslims are the least likely to oppose non-Muslims being their neighbors (18.2 percent), although this number cannot be considered negligible.

**Figure 2**

**Tolerance toward Non-Muslims**

% Muslim Respondents Who Objected




Among Muslims, those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more hostile toward other religious groups' socio-political expression (Figure 3).

**Figure 3**

**Tolerance toward Non-Muslims**

% Muslim Respondents Who Objected, by Support for Political Islam



We also asked the same question to non-Muslim respondents (P30), but most reported that they had no objections, and others said that they did not know or did not answer. The intolerance among non-Muslims may be low, or there could also be some uneasiness on the respondents' side in answering these questions.


**Easiness of Access**

We asked respondents about their opinions and experiences in accessing public services in two fundamental sectors (P4a and P7a in the Questionnaire): population services (in applying for a national ID card) and education (financial assistance for underprivileged students).

In line with other national surveys that show a relatively high degree of satisfaction with public services, most respondents (81 percent) reported that it is "easy" or "very easy" to apply for an ID card. A lower percentage (although still a majority, 55.8 percent) said it is "easy" or "very easy" to apply for education subsidies (Figure 4). There is very little difference here between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents (Figure 5).


**Figure 4**

Percentage Answering Easy or Very Easy to Access the Service  
% All Respondents Who Agree



**Figure 5**


Percentage Answering Easy or Very Easy to Access the Service  
% All Respondents Who Agree, by Religion



We also asked whether their opinion was based on their personal experience, accounts from others' experiences, news in the mass media, or based on other sources (P4b and P7b in the Questionnaire). Figure 6 shows that their views on the national ID Card application process are primarily based on their own experiences, both those who find the process easy or difficult (Figure 7).


**Figure 6**

Source of Perception (National ID Card)  
% of All Respondents



**Figure 7**


Source of Perception (National ID Card)  
% of All Respondents, by Perception



Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 8, perceptions about the ease of access in applying for the education subsidy are based on personal experience and accounts of other people's experiences (58 and 39.2 percent, respectively). There was little difference between respondents who considered the process easy or difficult (Figure 9).

**Figure 8**


% of All Respondents



**Figure 9**

Source of Perception (Education Subsidy)

% of All Respondents, by Perception



## Perceptions of Discrimination in Public Services


In addition to ease of access, we also asked respondents how inclusive or discriminatory they perceived the processes of public services to be, particularly in obtaining national ID cards and education subsidies (P5 and P8 in the Questionnaire). “Inclusive” is defined as the process being carried out without discriminating against citizens. “Discriminative” is defined as the process being carried out in a way that prioritizes certain citizens, for example, based on religion, ethnicity, gender, or economic class.

Overall, relatively few respondents perceive that the processes involved in applying for ID cards and obtaining education subsidies for poor students are discriminative (Figure 10). Of these two services/programs, more respondents perceive the education subsidy to involve more discriminative elements (13.1 percent) than the provision of ID cards (5.1 percent). Muslim and non-Muslim respondents did not differ much (Figure 11).

**Figure 10**


### Percentage Perceiving the Service as Discriminative

% All Respondents Who Agree



**Figure 11**

**Percentage Perceiving the Service as Discriminative**  
% All Respondents Who Agree, by Religion



### **Perceived Reasons for Discrimination in Access to Public Services**

We inquired further about the basis of discrimination against respondents who thought that public services were discriminative (P6 and P9 in the Questionnaire). Is it based on people's religion, ethnicity, gender, economic status, or something else?


By far, among those who perceive that the process of applying for a national ID card (KTP) involves some discrimination, the most cited the reason as being their economic status (Figure 12). This suggests that the respondents perceive the KTP application as more accessible for higher-income people than lower-income people.

Figure 13 shows that economic status is the most dominant reason for Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the non-Muslim respondents are somewhat less likely to cite financial reasons than the Muslim respondents and more likely to cite other reasons such as ethnicity and religion.

**Figure 12**

**Perceived Reason of Discrimination (National ID Card)**


% of All Respondents



**Figure 13**


**Perceived Reason of Discrimination (National ID Card)**

% of All Respondents, by Religion




This is also the case with the perceived discrimination in education subsidies. Among those who perceive the provision of education subsidies involves some discrimination, economic status is the most cited reason for discrimination (Figure 14). This applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, as shown in Figure 15, non-Muslims are less likely to cite economic reasons than Muslims and more likely to cite other reasons, such as ethnicity.

**Figure 14**



**Figure 15**



The consistent patterns in the national ID card and the education subsidy question suggest that Muslims and non-Muslims may have different experiences of discrimination. Yet, at the

same time, their most dominant experiences are still that of perceived economic discrimination.


### Women’s Access to Public Services

We asked people’s attitudes toward women’s role in society and women’s access to public services (P10 in the Questionnaire). Figure 16 shows the degree to which respondents agree with statements representing restrictive attitudes toward women.

The majority of respondents agree that women who visit government offices should be required to wear jilbab and dress modestly (60.7 percent); that there should be a rule that prohibits male healthcare workers (doctors and nurses) from treating female patients (58.6 percent); and that there should be a rule banning women from working at night (53.4 percent). These responses show a discriminative attitude towards women, which is also confirmed by other studies, such as by the SMERU Research Institute (2020). While our survey showed that only a few respondents believe that those who wear jilbab should be prioritized (page 45), this is not a contradiction. More specifically, most respondents agreed that "for the sake of politeness, women visiting government offices should be required to veil and dress modestly." But on the other hand, only a few felt that jilbab-wearing women should be prioritized in accessing the public services over women who do not. This could mean that support for prioritizing women is low even if they follow religious and moral norms.


However, a less restrictive attitude is shown toward women’s access to education services. Only 14.2 percent agreed that education subsidies should be given more to male students than to female students, and 27.5 percent agreed that boys and girls should be separated in different classrooms. In addition, as shown later in Figure 32 on page 35, only a few respondents thought that women wearing the headscarf should be prioritized in accessing four basic public services: ID card, assistance to the poor, scholarship access, and healthcare access.

**Figure 16**




Muslim respondents tend to hold more restrictive attitudes regarding women’s access to public and government services than non-Muslim respondents (Figure 17). Among Muslims, men tend to have more stringent attitudes than women (Figure 18).

**Figure 17**




**Figure 18**



Among Muslims, those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more supportive of restricting women’s access to public services than those who disagree with such a preference (Figure 19).

**Figure 19**



**Access to Civic Rights: Complaints about Mosque Loudspeaker**


The study also looked at the attitude of Muslim respondents regarding the controversy over the volume of mosque loudspeakers, which are sometimes considered too loud (P42 in the Questionnaire). We asked their opinion on whether it is permissible for a resident to request the mosque committee to lower the volume if the resident is: a Muslim neighbor, a non-practicing Muslim (who has never been to the mosque before), or a non-Muslim.

Virtually half of the Muslim respondents believed it is not permissible for any group to request a mosque to lower its loudspeaker volume (Figure 20). Muslim respondents seemed more accepting if the demand came from a Muslim individual, and they were less accepting if the request came from a non-Muslim, and even less accepting if the request came from a non-practicing Muslim. As shown later in our experiment, this partly discourages minority groups and some Muslim majority groups from expressing their opinions about mosque loudspeakers in public.

**Figure 20**

OK to Request Mosque to Lower Its Speaker Volume?

% Muslim Respondents Who Said Group May NOT Make Request




Many Muslims think it is not permissible to ask for the mosque’s loudspeakers to be lowered, regardless of whether the respondent supports political Islam or not. But those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more inclined to hold that view (Figure 21).

**Figure 21**

OK to Request Mosque to Lower Its Speaker Volume?

% Muslim Respondents Who Said Group May NOT Make Request, by Support for Political Islam



The issue of mosque loudspeakers is often sensitive and prone to politicization. For example, in Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra, ordinary citizens’ complaints about the volume of mosque

loudspeakers were easily distorted as blasphemy, triggering violence against the alleged blasphemers and their ethnic groups, and ending up in blasphemy convictions (Mulyartono, Rafsadie, Nur Sahid 2018). Given this example, respondents are likely reluctant to answer honestly about the mosque loudspeaker issue due to fear of repercussions or social disapproval.

### **Access to Civil Rights: Free Speech**

We did an experiment by using hypothetical questions with all respondents to find out whether respondents would be more willing to allow specific sensitive topics to be discussed publicly if the discussion is evidence-based and academic (P39 and P40 in the Questionnaire). The topics included communism, atheism, religious violence, LGBTQ, and critiques toward government and the Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI) and national police (*Polisi Republik Indonesia*, Polri). The respondents who were in the control group were asked whether they were willing to allow a university-based academic discussion on such topics. In contrast, those in the treatment group were asked whether they would allow such discussion if it were framed as academic.


On average, respondents would like to ban discussion of an average of 3.8 of the topics, and this number does not change much, even if the discussion is framed as an academic discussion. This shows that both groups of respondents, representative of adult Indonesians, agree that it is acceptable to ban discussion of “sensitive” topics, an indication of support for the repression of freedom of speech.

Figure 22 shows that topics considered off-limits by most respondents are atheism, communism, LGBTQ, and religious violence/religious-based terrorism. Interestingly, non-Muslim respondents tend to be more restrictive towards the discussion of these issues, especially discussions that are critical of Joko Widodo and those that are critical of the TNI/Polri. As shown in Figure 23, non-Muslims are more likely to support forbidding discussions critical of Joko Widodo and the TNI/Polri.

The fact that a vast majority of Indonesians support the banning of public and academic discussions of the four topics while also being willing to criticize the government or public services may indicate that Indonesians are selective in their belief of freedom of speech. There is almost no space for freedom of speech on issues around atheism, communism, homosexuality, and religious violence. Being selective on the arenas of freedom of speech is common in many countries. For example, in Thailand and Singapore, topics on homosexuality and atheism are more receptive compared to criticizing the government, specifically, in Thailand, topics related to monarchy are totally taboo. In the State of Florida for example, while many people believe in freedom of expression in general, certain topics such as gay and “woke” are not favorable.


**Figure 22**

**Attitudes toward Free Speech on Various Issues**  
% Respondents Who Said Must be Forbidden



**Figure 23**

**Attitudes toward Free Speech on Various Issues**  
% Respondents Who Said Must be Forbidden, by Religion




Among Muslims, those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are slightly more supportive of banning discussion on such topics than those who disagree with such a preference (Figure 24).

**Figure 24**

**Attitudes toward Free Speech on Various Issues**

% Muslim Respondents Who Said Must be Forbidden, by Islamism



Banning discussion of these topics is often justified under the pretext of defending pluralism and state ideology, as well as fighting hoaxes that are considered to threaten state order. Unfortunately, these measures are often implemented repressively without due process. One example is the dissolution of the hardcore organizations Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), as well as the digital threats against activists. Often, the lower one's social standing and the more limited one's network, the higher one's risk of being subjected to restrictive or criminalization measures.


**Acceptance of Government Discrimination**

Our survey also asks several experimental questions to explore some of the issues of interest. One relates to government discrimination (P37 and P38 in the Questionnaire). We asked Muslim respondents whether they would be more supportive of discriminatory policies if they were framed as the government's effort to follow the aspiration of society and religious leaders.

Overall, there is no effect on the percentage of respondents supporting discrimination. Framing discriminatory policies as something endorsed by society and religious leaders doesn't increase public support for them. However, the levels of support for discriminatory


policies are considerable. As shown in Figure 25, about 25 percent consent to policies that favor Muslim students over non-Muslim students in education subsidies, 26 percent agree with denying Shiites' and Ahmadis' access to civil registration services, and about 35 percent support a policy that prefers Quran memorizers (hafiz in Arabic) in the distribution of social programs.

**Figure 25**



Unsurprisingly, Muslims are more likely to support these government discriminations (Figure 26). Among Muslims, those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more supportive of these government discriminations than those who disagree with such a preference (Figure 27).


**Figure 26**



**Figure 27**

**Tolerating Government Discrimination**

% Muslim Respondents Who Said Acceptable, by Support for Political Islam




**Access Priority for Muslims**

We asked Muslim respondents whether they deserved to be prioritized over non-Muslims in accessing public services such as: applying for ID cards, applying for social aid, applying for scholarships or educational subsidies, and accessing healthcare services at local health facilities (P34 in the Questionnaire).

2.1 percent of Muslim respondents agree that they should receive priority over non-Muslims when accessing the four categories of public services (Figure 28). Those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more supportive of prioritizing Muslims over non-Muslims (Figure 29).


**Figure 28**

**Muslims Should be Prioritized over non-Muslims**  
 % Muslim Respondents Who Agree



**Figure 29**

**Muslims Should be Prioritized over non-Muslims**  
 % Muslim Respondents Who Agree, by Support for Political Islam




## Access Priority for Non-Heterodox Sects (Shiites and Ahmadis)


We also asked Muslim respondents whether they deserved to be prioritized in accessing the same public services mentioned in the previous section over the so-called heterodox groups, such as Shiites and Ahmadis (P35 in the Questionnaire).

Less than six percent of Muslim respondents agree that Shiites and Ahmadis should receive less priority when accessing the four categories of public services (Figure 30). Those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more supportive of prioritizing non-heterodox Muslims (Figure 31).

**Figure 30**




**Figure 31**



## Access Priority for Women with Headscarf


We asked Muslim respondents whether women wearing the headscarf (*jilbab*) should be prioritized over women without the headscarf in accessing the same public services as mentioned in the previous section (P36 in the Questionnaire). Although, as shown in Figure 16, 63 percent of Muslim respondents felt that women should wear the headscarf when visiting government offices, only a tiny percentage (1 to 2 percent) of Muslim respondents agree that women who wear the jilbab must receive priority over women who do not wear it when accessing the four categories of basic public services (Figure 32). This shows that while there is a general view that women should follow moral and religious norms, wearing it is not enough to prioritize access to basic services.

**Figure 32**



As with previous questions, those who agree that Islam must be preferred over other religions are more supportive of discrimination, in this case prioritizing women with the headscarf (Figure 33).

**Figure 33**



### 5.3 Oversampling Provinces

The following section provides an analysis of the results in USAID's eight priority provinces on five issues, i.e., religious intolerance, restrictions on women's access, complaints about mosque loudspeakers, acceptance of government discrimination, and acceptability of publicly discussing various topics.

As shown in the table below, of these eight provinces, four are Muslim-majority (Banten, Jakarta, East Java, South Sulawesi), two are relatively mixed (West Kalimantan and North Sumatra), and two are Muslim-minority (Papua and East Nusa Tenggara).

**Table 1**

Province	n	Muslim Proportion
Banten	390	99.74%
Jakarta	390	98.72%
East Java	390	97.69%
West Kalimantan	390	79.23%
East Nusa Tenggara	390	12.82%
Papua	390	36.67%
South Sulawesi	390	86.92%
North Sumatra	390	71.28%

#### Religious Intolerance among Muslim Respondents

The intolerance among Muslims on almost all issues is highest in Banten, West Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi, where they are the majority (Figure 34 below).<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the province with the lowest level of intolerance on most issues is East Nusa Tenggara, where Muslims are a minority. Papua and North Sumatra show a mixed picture. Intolerance in some matters, such as neighbors and public school principals of different religions, is relatively low. But intolerance in other matters is considerably high.


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<sup>3</sup> Abbreviated of the provinces: Jatim (East Java), Kalbar (West Kalimantan), NTT (East Nusa Tenggara), Sulsel (South Sulawesi), Sumut (North Sumatra)

Figure 34

Religious Intolerance

% Muslim Respondents in Each Province Who Objected



Women’s Access to Public Services

Figure 35 shows the percentage of respondents with a restrictive attitude toward women’s access to public services in each of USAID’s priority provinces. Out of the eight oversampled areas, South Sulawesi, Papua, North Sumatra, and Jakarta have the most significant percentage who hold a restrictive attitude on this issue.

These provinces are still among the most restrictive when we examine the Muslim respondents only. However, other provinces, such as East Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan, show more variation when we compare Muslim and non-Muslim respondents (Figure 36). For example, gender-restrictive views among Muslims in East Nusa Tenggara are generally quite low, except for the assertion that women must wear a *jilbab* headscarf when visiting government offices.

Figure 35

Public Service Access by Women  
% Total Respondents in Each Province Who Agree





Figure 36

Public Service Access by Women  
% Muslim Respondents in Each Province Who Agree



Note:  
ASN: civil servants. TNI, Polri: Indonesian military and police


## Complaints about Mosque Loudspeaker

Figure 37 shows that Muslims are most resistant to complaints about mosque loudspeakers in places where they are a minority, such as East Nusa Tenggara and Papua. This implies that tensions or sensitivities around this issue are high in these areas. In other provinces such as East Java, where Muslims, especially traditionalists, are the majority, they tend to be more relaxed about complaints about mosque loudspeakers.

Figure 37

## Religious Intolerance

% Muslim Respondents in Each Province Who Said Group Should Not Complain




## Acceptance of Government Discrimination

Figure 38 shows that Muslim support for the government's discriminatory policies (prioritizing majority groups and excluding minority groups) is most prevalent in South Sulawesi and Papua. While the former is a Muslim-majority province, the latter is a province where Muslims are a significant minority, or at least a mixed province. In regions where Muslims are overwhelmingly a minority, such as East Nusa Tenggara, Muslim support for discriminatory policies is very low.

**Figure 38**

**Tolerating Government Discrimination**

% Muslim Respondents in Each Province Who Said Acceptable




**Acceptability of Various Discussion Topics**

Restrictive attitudes towards discussing sensitive topics (communism, atheism, homosexuality, and religious violence) are found in almost all eight priority provinces. However, as shown in Figure 39, restrictive attitudes are highest in South Sulawesi and North Sumatra and relatively lowest in East Nusa Tenggara. Restrictive attitudes towards criticism of Joko Widodo and the TNI/Polri are generally low in almost all provinces except West Kalimantan, Papua, and North Sumatra. However, this may also indicate that people's anxiety in discussing criticism of the government is higher in these regions.

**Figure 39**


Attitudes toward Free Speech on Various Issues  
 % Respondents in Each Province Who Said NOT Acceptable



The picture remains more or less the same when we look only at Muslim respondents in these regions (Figure 40). However, East Nusa Tenggara stands out when we look only at Muslim respondents, especially regarding criticism of Joko Widodo and the TNI/Polri. Compared to other provinces, Muslims in East Nusa Tenggara, where they are a minority, are more likely to consider criticism of the government off-limits.

**Figure 40**

Attitudes toward Free Speech on Various Issues  
 % Muslim Respondents in Each Province Who Said NOT Acceptable



## 5.4 Factors Associated with or Predicting Exclusion


This section explains the relationships between variables associated with social intolerance, which is informed by the scoping study and literature review. Section A describes a correlation matrix, and the subsequent sections display a regression analysis that explains factors influencing restrictive attitudes toward women, non-Muslims, and religious minorities.

### Correlation between variables

Figure 41 presents the correlation coefficients between variables. The blue coefficient indicates a positive correlation between the two groups of variables, which is that as one goes up, the other goes up. The red coefficient shows a negative correlation—as one goes higher, the other goes lower.

We found a low to moderate positive correlation between support for political Islam, religious intolerance, and restrictive attitudes toward women. Support for political Islam is reflected in views such as that the government must prioritize Islam over other religions; Islamic leaders (ulama) should be more influential in political life; regions in Indonesia should be allowed to implement Islamic law at the local level; Islamic/*Shari'a* law should be implemented throughout Indonesia; blasphemy against Islam should be punished more severely; when participating in general elections, it is imperative to choose a Muslim leader, and; Islam should be the only official religion in Indonesia.

Figure 41




Beyond that, the correlations between the other variables are relatively negligible. Religious practice, or how often the respondent performs religious ritual practices (P22 in the Questionnaire), has no significant correlation with any variables except a faint relationship with religious intolerance. That is also the case with religious identity, or how attached a person is to their religion (P31 in the Questionnaire), which has little correlation except with the support of political Islam. Support for democracy (P14 and P16 in the Questionnaire) is also not strongly correlated with other variables.

### Restrictive Attitudes on Women’s Access to Public Services

From the regression analysis (Figure 42), we can draw some insights regarding restrictive attitudes toward women’s access to public services (P10 in the Questionnaire). Firstly, women are less supportive of restrictive measures. In addition, religious intolerance and support for political Islam are related to holding restrictive attitudes toward women. Those who are intolerant toward non-Muslims and support political Islam tend to be more supportive of restrictive measures.

In addition, perceived discrimination in accessing public services has a noticeable relationship with restrictive attitudes toward women’s access to public services. Those who perceive discrimination in getting national ID cards and education subsidies tend to also be more supportive of the restrictive measures for women. However, this association might be counter-intuitive, resulting from statistical exercise in which the conceptual logic might need further exploration. Since the main reason for discrimination is economic status, there is likely a relationship between economic vulnerability and restrictive perceptions of women. However, this will require further investigation.

**Figure 42**




## Access Priority for Muslims

Among 2.1 percent of Muslims who agree that they must receive priority over non-Muslims, the noticeable correlating factors are education level and a sense of religious identity. Religious intolerance and support for political Islam have no apparent relationship with the likelihood of desiring Muslims to be prioritized in public services.

Regression analysis in Figure 43 shows that education is negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting access priority for Muslims. Those with higher education are less likely to agree that Muslims should receive priority. Engagement in education might foster a sense of pluralism and equality on this specific issue.

In contrast, religious identity has a slightly positive relationship with the likelihood of supporting prioritizing Muslims. Those with a strong religious identity are more likely to agree that Muslims should receive priority. But, again, the percentage of those who hold that view is marginal.

**Figure 43**




## Access Priority for Non-Heterodox Muslims

The percentage of Muslims who agree they must receive priority as a non-heterodox group is also not that prominent. The regression analysis in Figure 44 found almost no statistically noticeable relationships with the likelihood of prioritizing non-heterodox groups from heterodox groups, specifically Shiites and Ahmadis. What stands out among these variables, if any, are religious practice and religious intolerance. Those with higher religious observance and intolerance are more likely to agree that heterodox groups should have less priority.

**Figure 44**

Non-Shia/Non-Ahmadiyya Must be Prioritized over Shia/Ahmadiyya  
(Muslim respondents only)




**Access Priority for Women with *Jilbab***

As shown before, few respondents (1 to 2 percent) think women who wear the *jilbab* (headscarf) must be prioritized over women who do not. From the regression analysis in Figure 45, we can see two factors that might be related to its likelihood, i.e., gender and support of political Islam. Women tend to oppose being prioritized based on their jilbab alone. Muslim men, especially those more supportive of political Islam, are more likely to think that women wearing the jilbab should be prioritized.

**Figure 45**


Women with Hijab Must be Prioritized over Women without Hijab  
(Muslim respondents only)



## Complaints about Mosque Loudspeaker

In line with the previous issues, intolerance and support for Islamic politics have a statistically noticeable relationship with the likelihood of supporting the suppressing of complaints about a mosque’s loudspeakers (Figure 46). Those more religiously intolerant and more supportive of political Islam are more likely to be concerned with people protesting the volume of mosque loudspeakers. Regression analysis in Figure 46 shows that older people tend to be less concerned about people protesting the volume of mosque speakers.

**Figure 46**



In addition to direct questions, we also asked indirect questions through a list experiment to determine whether respondents hid their views on this matter. In this list experiment, respondents were assigned to two groups. One group was given the four-item control list, while the other group was given the same list with the additional treatment item, “The mosque loudspeaker in my neighborhood is too loud.” The experimental study indicates that people hide their complaints about the mosque’s loudspeakers when deemed too loud.

The table below shows the mean number of items to which respondents agreed in the control list and the mean number of items to which respondents agreed in the treatment list with corresponding standard errors. We compute the estimate of the percentage of respondents who believe that the mosque speaker in their neighborhood is too loud by taking the difference in the mean number of items agreed to across the two lists.

By subtracting the mean number of items in the control group (1.2487 items) from the mean in the treatment group (1.4632 items), we estimate that 21 percent of respondents actually think that the mosque speaker in their neighborhood is too loud. This compares to 4 percent of respondents who agreed with the statement when asked directly. The vast discrepancy with the direct question suggests that many people conceal their views, perhaps fearing social disapproval or repercussions.

Sample (n):

```
##Group
## 1 2
## 1 1918 22
## 2 45 1895
```

Direct question:

```
##      Too Loud Just Right Too Low
##      0.04470309      0.91264385      0.04265306
```

List experiment:

```
##      mean      SE
## dv_treatment 1.4632 0.0451
```

```
##      mean      SE
## dv_control 1.2487      0.0362
```

```
##      mean      SE
## difference      0.2145      0.0451
```

## 6 KEY FINDINGS: CASE STUDIES

To complement the survey, we completed six case studies, namely:

1. Incorporating Religious Values in Local Regulations and Their Impact on Public Services: A Comparative Study of Public Order Bylaws (Peraturan Daerah) in Cirebon Regency and Values Bylaws in Tasikmalaya City;
2. Marginalized Group Resistance Initiative: A Case Study of *Pesantren* Waria Al-Fatah in Yogyakarta;
3. Civil Society Initiatives Against Intolerance: A Comparative Study of the Draft Local Regulations (*Raperda*) of Tolerance in Pontianak and Banjarmasin Cities;
4. Legal and Constitutional Battles: A Case Study of Discriminatory Rules and Practices of Mandatory Jilbab in Padang City State Schools, West Sumatra;
5. Tolerance Policy Initiatives by Former Activists: A Case Study of the Experience of the Law on Advancement of Culture; and
6. Shrinking Civic Space and Restrictions on Civil Liberties in Indonesia: A Landscape Analysis.

Below we present some of the main conclusions from each case study. The complete report of these case studies is available in Annex 3.

## 6.1 Incorporating Religious Values in Local Regulations and Their Impact on Public Services

The local regulation (Perda) on Public Order (2015) in Cirebon Regency and the Perda on the Value of Religious Community Life (2014) in Tasikmalaya City are both driven by Islamism (a political ideology that posits that modern states should be reconstituted constitutionally, economically, and judicially in accordance with their interpretation of the Quran), although the names and content are different. They, for example, contain regulations on conditions for selling alcohol in hotels. The issuances of the two bylaws were supported, or at least not rejected, by politicians from both secular parties and Islamic parties, who occupied key posts in the local executive and legislative bodies. In Cirebon, the Perda was signed by the regent from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Indonesian: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), while in Tasikmalaya by the mayor came from the United Development Party (PPP) and was also supported by politicians from the National Awakening Party (PKB), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Democratic Party (PD).

The issuance of the Perda in Cirebon and Tasikmalaya contains more symbolic meaning (in terms of demonstrating power and political support) than their actual demonstrated effects on access to public services and civil liberties. They were seemingly done to build an image of fighting for Islam by accommodating the demands of influential Islamist groups in both districts and serving as additional socio-political capital to gain voter support in the elections. The reason cited by informants for the ineffectiveness of these Perda was the lack of or limited budget provided by the local government in both regions to enforce/implement the two district regulations. However, in the long run, local regulations containing favoritism against particular religious values may provide an authorizing environment for both vertical and horizontal intolerances. For example, there are some communal intolerant actions by some religious groups, on behalf of law enforcement.

The existence and advocacy of defenders of pluralism from among CSOs played an essential role in determining the final content of the Perdass in both districts. Although both districts have a Muslim majority population and a strong presence of the culture advanced by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Islamic organization, which is generally considered more moderate, in Cirebon, NU is stronger as an organization that can offset the demands of Islamist groups than in Tasikmalaya. One piece of evidence of this is the existence and advocacy of the Fahmina Institute in Cirebon, whose influence has an impact not only on the local and regional levels but even at the national level. Together with other pluralist figures and activists, Fahmina Institute activists actively lobbied so that the content of the Perda would not threaten pluralism too much. This explains why in Cirebon, only some of the demands of Islamist groups are included in the Perda, as the scope is more limited and does not involve religious figures in its implementation, unlike in Tasikmalaya. This could also be why there is only one Perda with religious themes like this in Cirebon, while in Tasikmalaya, there is more than one that mutually strengthen each other. The advocacy of CSOs such as the Fahmina Institute reflects one example of the positive steps that advocates of pluralism can take in a democracy, where they still accept the existence of other groups that disagree with them and negotiate with them.

While both the local regulations are about what religious (Islamic) society and public order look like, for some groups, they serve as a legal basis to enforce their values and norms in public space. Thus, the implementation of these local regulations in both districts has created more barriers for mainly lower-middle-income communities in exercising their rights to access economic and public services. For example, workers in karaoke entertainment venues or pay-by-hour-class hotels, as their ability to improve their economic welfare is impaired. More specifically, these local bylaws in both districts restrict access to health services for certain groups of workers, especially sex workers and people with HIV/AIDS, because they make it challenging to collect data on them and provide health services to them. Meanwhile, the two bylaws do not impact certain religious minority groups, such as the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community (*Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia* in Indonesian), because their management in these two regions is regulated by another regulation, the Three Ministers' Decree on Ahmadiyah (2008).

## 6.2 Marginalized Group Resistance Initiative

Based in Yogyakarta, *Pesantren* al-Fatah (an Islamic boarding school) was established by a movement of transgender people (*waria*) in Central Java that uses religious symbols in fighting for their common transgender interests, just as the Fahmina Institute two decades ago began to fight for the equality of women's and men's groups by developing an alternative Islamic theology of gender equality. This movement collaborates with other transgender groups both inside and outside of Yogyakarta. This is a significant breakthrough because the religious argument against acceptance of transgender people is one of the arguments that is often used in Indonesian society to marginalize such groups. In this context, while meeting their spiritual needs, they also fight for their rights to obtain public services. However, compared to the achievements that the Fahmina Institute has so far achieved in the equality of women and men, the accomplishments of transgender advocacy with religious language have not been as substantial.

Although their *pesantren* was attacked by the Islamic Jihad Front (FJI) in 2016, which temporarily suspended their activities, it is important to note that *Pesantren* al-Fatah still exists in 2022 (having been established in 2008). The continued existence of this *Pesantren* in Yogyakarta is associated with strong public support for pluralism in general in Yogyakarta. Despite the lack of support from the Muhammadiyah Islamic movement in Yogyakarta, their existence was supported by several NU figures, the women's branch of NU (Fatayat NU), academics of the State Islamic University (UIN) Yogyakarta, several CSO activists in Yogyakarta, and certain figures in the provincial and district/city governments. It is difficult to imagine that Islamic boarding schools like this could stand and survive in a region in Indonesia with low support for pluralism and where support for transgender rights is very low or non-existent.

Transgender people are among the social groups in Indonesia that are most vulnerable to being victims of discrimination because of their identity. However, the experience of transgender activists at *Pesantren* al-Fatah shows that some public services are easy to obtain and others are difficult. No type is more accessible than the other as a general rule, but the ease of access depends on the situation and personal relationships with certain strategic actors. For example, access to HIV/AIDS drugs is generally easier for transgender people

because the government is interested in reducing the spread of the disease. In addition, the procurement of ID cards for them became more accessible during the COVID-19 pandemic because the government had an interest in increasing vaccination rates. They also benefitted from training transgender people in entrepreneurial skills from the local government's social service. In addition, personal relationships with strategic actors such as officials or service providers in hospitals help them access public services. The intervention of *Pesantren* al-Fatah staff on behalf of transgender people, and the *pesantren's* attachment to a network of other transgender groups, has also strengthened their capacity to gain access to public services. The most difficult public service for them to obtain has been the state's formal recognition of *Pesantren* al-Fatah's existence, for example, as a foundation (*yayasan*).

From the experience of *Pesantren* al-Fatah, the main internal challenges faced were internal divisions regarding the direction of the *pesantren* between the leadership with a *kyai* (a Javanese Islamic cleric or scholar) who was an initial supporter when their *pesantren* was founded—on the vision of the *pesantren*. The *kyai's* preference is that the *pesantren* should not grow like others in terms of recruitment of the students (or *santri* in Indonesian), open for *non waria*. The other challenge is limited resources and revenues, a lack of systematic organizing, and a lack of collaboration with other *waria* communities in Yogyakarta. *Pesantren* al-Fatah utilizes support from various parties such as Fatayat NU, church, and CSOs to overcome its economic limitations. Al-Fatah's management also received inputs and reinforcement from several national and international CSOs to strengthen the institutional structure of their lodges. Meanwhile, *Pesantren* al-Fatah has sent students to entrepreneurship training to enhance the institution's financial management. Lastly, al-Fatah has expressed an openness to collaborating more with other *waria* communities for the sustainability of the *waria* advocacy movement as a whole in Yogyakarta.

Meanwhile, the external challenges faced are enduring sneers and physical attacks from intolerant groups such as the "Defender of Ka'bah" and the lack of government institutional support for *Pesantren* al-Fatah. Overcoming this, they insist on defending the lodge despite the sneers and physical attacks in the belief that transgender people are legitimate as Indonesian citizens and are entitled to services wherever they are. Overcoming the nomenclature rules that prohibited the use of the word "transvestite" in the organization's name, they changed the name for the sake of the organization's sustainability. In this context, as of publication of this report, they had not planned to challenge provisions that harmed the transgender community in Yogyakarta or Indonesia more widely. So far, *Pesantren* Al-Fatah also has no plans to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, given the complex requirements.

### **6.3 Civil Society Initiatives Against Intolerance: A Comparative Study**

The Draft of Local Regulation (*Rancangan Peraturan Daerah* or *Raperda*) of Tolerance in Pontianak City, West Kalimantan, and Banjarmasin City, South Kalimantan, are the first proposed *Raperdas* initiated by civil society in these places, as their academic manuscripts and drafts were made by CSO activists. The two *Raperdas* are meant to institutionalize governmental support in strengthening inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony at the local level. In Banjarmasin City, the *Raperda* was submitted by the Institute for Islamic and

Community Studies (LK3), while in Pontianak City, the *Raperda* was submitted by the Equatorial Asa Beacon Foundation (SAKA).

Although it has the same title, the drafts of the *Raperdas* on Tolerance in Pontianak and Banjarmasin have several differences in substance in terms of (1) regulatory orientation; (2) the definition of tolerance; (3) the actors involved; (4) the utilization of local wisdom in Banjarmasin; and (5) sanctions and awards. The difference in substance has also resulted in different receptions in each district. For example, the definition of tolerance in the *Raperda* in Pontianak, which includes the word “gender,” raised concerns from civil society in Pontianak because organizations that support tolerance are afraid of being perceived as supporting LGBTQ, which is not in the Banjarmasin *Raperda*’s definition of tolerance.

Although the two *Raperdas* were both proposed through legislative initiatives, they have both faced different ratification challenges. While the draft in Banjarmasin reached the ratification stage by late 2022, the draft in Pontianak is still in the review processes by the Local Regulation Formation Agency (*Badan Pembentukan Peraturan Daerah*, or Bapemperda).

The experience of the two initiatives above shows that there are at least four key factors that can drive the success of tolerance policy advocacy, and all of these are interrelated: (1) the credibility of CSO activists; (2) personal relationships of CSO activists with officials in government agencies; (3) civil society network support; and (4) the local government’s interest in the report on tolerant cities published by Setara Institute, a Jakarta-based CSO. The ratification process around the *Raperda* on Tolerance in Banjarmasin has run more smoothly partly because these four conditions above were more optimal. LK3 in Banjarmasin is also an older and more established organization (founded in 1993) with a broader network than SAKA in Pontianak.

Creating an alternative legal draft for a regulation is a commendable CSO initiative to counter discriminative religious conservatism-based bylaws. But this kind of policy advocacy can make CSOs even more burdened by policy advocacy work, which relies heavily on the political process and mobilization of critical community participation. Donor support and long-term network strengthening are urgently needed to oversee the ratification process of the draft regulation for it to succeed in becoming a Regional Regulation. This support is especially needed among CSOs still developing a relationship with local government institutions, such as SAKA in Pontianak, which was only established in 2015.

#### **6.4 Legal and Constitutional Disputes: A Case Study of Discriminative Rules and Practices of Mandatory Jilbab Headscarf**

Intolerance practices that impact discrimination in public services can take the form of government regulations (policies or decrees) or social regulations (community attitudes or practices). One example is the religiously inspired public policy in Padang City, West Sumatra, which practically requires wearing the jilbab for all school students (Padang Mayor’s Instruction No. 451.442/BINSOS-iii/2005). While the rule requires the wearing of the jilbab among Muslim students only, in practice, this regulation has enabled a new norm that wearing jilbab is culturally mandatory for all girls, citing “being respectful to local social norms” is a discretionary decision by the local authorities.

Since the policy was passed, female students forced to wear the jilbab have followed the rule. However, in January 2021, a Christian student at the local school SMKN 2 Padang City refused to submit to the rule. The controversy that arose from it became the trigger for three ministries at the national level – the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Education – to issue a Joint Ministerial Decree prohibiting schools from requiring the use of religious attire in school uniforms. The Joint Ministerial Decree was signed and announced nationally on February 3, 2021.

However, objecting to the Decree, on March 8, 2021, the Minangkabau Customary Institute (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, or LKAAM) applied for a Supreme Court review of the above Ministerial Decree. On May 3, 2021, the Supreme Court found the LKAAM's position correct and overturned the Ministerial Decree. Three male judges made the decision: H. Yulius (chair), Irfan Fachruddin, and Is Sudaryono. The Ministerial Decree was overturned on the grounds that the students were minors who were not entitled to choose their own clothes in the context of the school's uniform policies.

The above ruling drew disappointment from CSO activists in women's rights and other human rights. This clearly shows that even national policies issued by three ministers can still be trumped by the demands of a group of civil society activists asserting that local wisdom must be prioritized. Regional contexts with high levels of conservatism require specific strategies such as dialogue and special lobbying rather than legal approaches or 'naming and shaming' campaigns to prevent retaliation from local communities that can actually be counterproductive to the protection of victims and vulnerable groups.

In addition, mandatory jilbab rules negatively affect not only access to educational services but also population administration and can lead to continued discrimination in other sectors. The obligation to wear the jilbab in schools has sometimes forced non-Muslim students to wear the jilbab in photos for diplomas and ID cards. This has led to difficulty finding work on allegations of forgery of the diplomas because, in the photos for their official documents, they wore a jilbab, which is associated with Islam, but on the ID, it was written that they are non-Muslims.

In addition, the mandatory jilbab rule negatively affects not only non-Muslim female students and women but also Muslim women. A singular interpretation of Islamic religious rules regarding the jilbab makes it difficult for Muslim women in Padang to protest the mandatory jilbab for fear of being accused of being non-Muslim. Advocacy and protection for Muslim women who do not wear a jilbab are also more difficult because coercion is considered to have a religious justification which is perceived to have a sacred and non-negotiable value.

The discriminatory rules and practices of mandatory jilbab-wearing in Padang have been going on for a long time, since at least 2005, after the mayor's instruction on student uniforms. This phenomenon is part of the trend of religious bylaws that regulate morality and clothing, especially for women in public spaces. Without the initiative and courage of pupils or guardians to protest or resist, the mandatory discriminative rules and practices around the jilbab will continue to be normalized.

## 6.5 Countering Intolerance from Within: A Case Study of the Experience of the Law on Advancement of Culture

Law No. 5 (2017) on the Advancement of Culture (*Undang-Undang Pemajuan Kebudayaan*) was passed by the Indonesian parliament (DPR) in April 2017. The law gives a new breath of fresh air to cultural life in Indonesia because the definition it uses of culture is very broad, oriented not only to the preservation or protection of culture, but especially to its promotion, encouraging public participation in its implementation, starting from a very local level, and positioning the government more as a facilitator. The vision of the drafters of this law, which includes a progressive Director General of Culture, is to facilitate the sustainability of the creative process of cultural workers in Indonesia, who are increasingly empowered to associate with various international cultural movements and are ready to compete at the global level while remaining rooted in their own local cultural strength. The issuance of this law marks a new chapter in cultural development in Indonesia and reflects a small revolution in the management of this sector in the country, which has an impact on strengthening tolerance and improving the public service sector. Activists working to enhance the right to free expression or freedom of religion or belief, for example, can use the opportunities provided by the issuance of this law to achieve their goals.

In the relatively short period of the last five years (2017-2022), the implementation of the Law on the Advancement of Culture has proven to have a positive impact on strengthening tolerance and public services because the objects of the cultural promotion it formulated have been very broad (including, for example, local customs and beliefs). There is also awareness among activists of the necessity of calculating the social benefits of cultural activities (such as strengthening cohesion and tolerance) and how implementing the Law has encouraged public participation and access to the cultural endowment fund. Even from the limited scope of this study, several major impacts were noted, for example, in the increasing prevalence of cultural festivals, strengthening research and advocacy on the rights of indigenous peoples by the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), a research and education institution under Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the increasing enthusiasm for the field of anthropology and archaeology studies on various campuses, and the establishment of the Cultural Endowment Fund (*Dana Abadi Kebudayaan*), which was enthusiastically welcomed. Broader studies and more data sources are needed to find out the full impact of the above policies in a wider scope, for example, throughout Indonesia, which is beyond the capacity of these case studies.

These efforts to contain intolerance from within the bureaucracy were possible partly due to Hilmar Farid, the Director General of Culture, whose unique background as a civil society activist allowed him to gain the trust and recognition of the other cultural activists who have long been dissatisfied with the direction of cultural policy and worked hard to advocate for change, such as the cultural activists who joined the Arts Coalition (*Koalisi Seni Indonesia*, or KSI). With these modalities (legitimacy and key partners), Dr. Farid managed to leverage political, social, and technical support for the whole policy cycle (from agenda setting to policy formulation and implementation). The case also shows that having a supportive policy is still only part of the game, just like other development problems in Indonesia – the problem of implementation capability remains. It takes professional knowledge (and an understanding of ‘the art of the possible’) to address the implementation problem.

As Director General of Culture, Hilmar Farid said that his initiatives to contain social intolerance from within, and as a government official, need much creativity – thinking and working politically. For example, despite having enough authority to make and execute policies, he must adapt to the iron fist of rules and bureaucratic nomenclature for those policies to work and achieve their goals. Other than the commitment to bring about change, it is also necessary for him and the drafters to understand the political economy of the government bureaucracy to succeed in this aspect. The limited sources of this case study have not allowed us to assess Hilmar Farid’s claim precisely. Regardless of whether the claim does have a solid basis, his experience so far should be a source of learning for other (former) activists who decide to work as part of the government. In addition, Dr. Farid’s experience can also be compared with the experience of other former activists who have been working as part of the government, of which there are now quite a few, and lessons can be drawn from these comparisons.

The policies of the Director General of Culture have the potential to last a long time because they open up opportunities for civil society to participate in implementing them, including by controlling their implementation, such as through the Cultural Endowment Fund. While it is clear that it will still take some time to test the extent to which the Law’s intentions have come to fruition, it is also safe to conclude that it could have stopped or stalled if Hilmar Farid’s superiors had ceased to support him and urged the cancellation of his various policies arbitrarily.

## **6.6 Shrinking Civic Space and Restrictions on Civil Liberties in Indonesia**

The practice of restricting civil liberties in Indonesia varies in terms of actors and forms and occurs either offline or online. The four forms of state action that restrict civil liberties are (1) threats and acts of violence; (2) digital repression; (3) the use of a repressive legal framework; and (4) the use of administrative authority. Meanwhile, non-state actors restrict civil liberties in three forms: (1) threatening or disrupting activities, such as discussions on specific themes like LGBTQ rights and demonstrations against the Omnibus Law; (2) the intervention of leaders of institutions such as universities that restrict the civil liberties of students or campus press institutions; and (3) online threats, such as when a company threatens to sue a customer because of a complaint the latter made online under mechanism outlined in the ITE Law.

Although readily available, the government does not consistently enforce the rules regarding the restriction of civil liberties. The timing of when restrictive laws are used generally depends on three factors: (1) the popularity of the issue of the affected group or individual; (2) the sensitivity of the issue; and (3) political momentum. It is also carried out with consideration of who the potential victims are. For that reason, the enforcement is inconsistent and can amount to “selective cutting.” Meanwhile, the degree to which the restrictions impact their victims can be analyzed according to four facets: (1) victims’ access to activist networks; (2) the scale of media coverage; (3) the number of supporters for the victims from among CSOs; and (4) victims’ access to legal aid institutions such as the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*, or YLBHI). The lower a person’s social standing in the public eye and the more limited the person’s network, the higher the person’s risk of being subject to restrictive or criminalization measures.

Finally, there are five forms of responses of CSO activists to the narrowing of civic space: (1) increasing digital security; (2) pursuing legal advocacy; (3) strengthening networks for activism; (4) strengthening collaboration with institutions such as in the publication of joint reports; and (5) designing campaigns with specific word choices or narratives. In short, there is a general tendency among CSO activists to commit self-censorship because of the issues above, but at the same time to strengthen themselves by networking and studying and practicing various ways of maintaining security from cyberattacks.

## **6.7 Summary: Challenges faced by CSOs in responding to intolerance**

Our case studies found that in addressing intolerance, dialogue and critical engagement may sometimes be preferable to legal approaches or “naming and shaming” to avoid social repercussions on victims and vulnerable groups. This can be seen in the case of the mandatory jilbab in Padang, West Sumatra, where even a national policy issued by three ministers could still be trumped by social pressure in the local area.

The Fahmina Institute’s bridging and engagement with CSOs and local government is a success story. The institute’s engagement with local Islamic figures and organizations helped strengthen local resilience to Islamism. That partly explains why NU in Cirebon, for instance, was stronger in stemming Islamism than in Tasikmalaya. Likewise, the Fahmina Institute’s working relationship with the local and national government helps them lobby policymakers so that the content of local regulations does not undermine pluralism.

The case of the transgender group at the Al-Fatah boarding school shows that vulnerable groups can overcome exclusion if they are empowered enough and have a working relationship with strategic actors. For instance, they can access HIV/AIDS drugs and ID cards quite easily. This is partly supported by the government’s interest in implementing their program in the health sector. But the network and capacity of *Pesantren* Al-Fatah are no less important.

Their network with other transgender groups supports their capacity. They also often receive training such as on entrepreneurial skills from the local government’s social services. Their personal relationships with officials and service providers in hospitals also make it easier for them to access health services.

Our case studies observed various ways CSOs’ activists have reacted to the challenge of rising intolerance. In short, besides media advocacy and personal initiatives against exclusionary service provision, they have also taken or supported legal actions to challenge the existing discriminative laws, such as the regulation on mandatory jilbab-wearing in Padang City. Moreover, some CSO activists in Banjarmasin and Pontianak, for example, actively initiated local regulations that could enhance tolerance. In another direction, some campus-based advocacy activists, e.g., at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at the University of Gadjah Mada, strengthened the right of the indigenous peoples to practice their own traditional beliefs by using the Advancement of Culture Law.

However, Indonesian CSO activists also face their own challenges. Below we highlight the three most important of them. Firstly, in the last five years, and following the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2016 and the presidential election in 2019, escalating political

polarization in the country has split CSO activists along their support for either Islamist or pluralist ideological inclinations, which has reduced their capacity and resources to coherently combat intolerance. Some of them, for example, supported the government's illiberal action to ban organizations such as HTI or FPI without due process under the pretext that these organizations are dangerous to Indonesia's pluralism.

Secondly, the present shrinking civic space itself, including digital repression by the state apparatus and segments of society, has affected how CSO activists work. Concerned about being criminalized for their personal opinions under the ITE Law, for instance, they self-censor their opinions or stop voicing any opinion on public affairs altogether. This has also reduced their capacity and resources.

Thirdly, while the challenges they face nowadays are more complex, the resources for CSOs' operational funding are decreasing from foreign and domestic donors, particularly for CSO activities regarding research, which is crucial for enhancing policy advocacy. It may be the case that for this reason, some liberal CSO activists have had to cease their work ardently defending democracy.

## **7 RECOMMENDATIONS**

General recommendation for the government on political processes underpinning exclusionary public service provision: One of the major unintended consequences of electoral democracy in Indonesia after political reforms (1998) and decentralization (2001) has been the prevalence of populist politicians who sell conservative and illiberal campaign promises to win elections, which strengthened the general call for political Islam in Indonesia, both at the national and local levels. Unfortunately, given the increasing conservatism of the Indonesian population, it appears that all politicians compete in that same direction, so much so that even the polarization between the so-called pluralist and Islamist politicians in the last ten years has pushed the Indonesian political spectrum further into conservative and illiberal values and agendas. This, in turn, affects how elected politicians provide public services through their policies, the public officials they appoint, and the budgets they allocate. It is beyond the scope of this study to make any specific recommendation on this issue. Still, a more inclusionary provision of public service in Indonesia in the future necessitates the resolution of this problem.

General recommendation for CSOs: Indonesian civil society activists are well remembered for their joining forces in protesting against and removing the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 and accelerating the reformasi movement, regardless of their noticeable internal differences and divisions. However, the experience of two decades of reformasi has shown that they are not always democratic and liberal in their ideological orientation and are not necessarily independent from the state as they are commonly portrayed or somewhat romanticized. In the first ten years after reformasi, some of them even started to behave in ways that were precisely "uncivil" by, for instance, making open calls for the state to ban public discussion on controversial issues such as LGBTQ rights. Moreover, in the last ten years, increased political polarization following general elections in 2014 and 2019 has split them further along pluralist and Islamist ideological orientations. Alarming, this has reduced their

principled commitment to basic values and norms of democracy, such as the right to freedom of expression and association. It has consequently increased state willingness to repress any opposition. For this reason, it is time now for the core of civil society activists to revisit their agendas and refocus their activism on defending democracy at all costs, as they have done before. They need to be aware that the partisan and unprincipled support they provide for the regime's arbitrary repression against the groups they dislike could also harm their interests in the future.

General recommendations for the donor community: The decentralization process has provided increased scope for and scale of civil society activists to influence authority and policy decisions and implementation to benefit vulnerable groups in accessing public services at the local level. When discriminative public service provision in one sector is made, it is not necessarily because the authority or frontline provider responsible for that has a personal or institutional inclination to act exclusionary, but also perhaps because of demand for that by intolerant activists. For this reason, it is crucial to mobilize resources to demand more inclusionary public service provision and ensure that the responsible authorities gain support, partnership, and assistance when needed. Public service provision for vulnerable groups such as transgender or religious minority groups (as well as indigenous people) has been more successful and effective when all the stages of public service design (policies and technical design) and implementation (provision of services) are made with them.

Although many women activists find that religious conservatism in Indonesia is less helpful in campaigning for women's empowerment in particular and gender equality in general, they also find that faith-based women's Muslim organizations such as Fatayat of Nahdlatul Ulama and Aisyiyah of Muhammadiyah could play a significant role in educating women at the most local level and providing them with the organizational framework to be involved in social and political activities. This is for two reasons: First, they already have programs that target women's empowerment; and second, although they are not ideologically liberal, they are more supportive of the issues concerning women's empowerment in comparison to Islamist women organizations such as Family Love Alliance (*Aliansi Cinta Keluarga*, or AILA). The role and capacity of such organizations to fill this need to be supported further. Since women seem to be particularly exposed to religious discrimination, a strong focus on how to improve gender-based perceptions generally is also recommended.

General recommendation for future studies: While surveys can capture general perceptions on issues, they sometimes fall short of recording genuine responses on issues that are considered sensitive. This is evident, for example, from the gap in direct and indirect responses about mosque loudspeakers. Including comparison or experimental questions in surveys, among others, is essential. Moreover, whether an exclusionary or discriminative act in public service provision is caused or triggered by intolerance or conservatism needs to be carefully measured according to the public service sector, because each sector has its own standards of measurement. The relationship between the two also needs to be investigated in its specific contexts to ensure that the first is indeed caused by the second. For this reason, we recommend more and further studies along this line of investigation to capture the relationship between intolerance and public service provision in more detail and to establish causation.

## 8 CONCLUSION

This study was premised on concerns about the impact of rising intolerance on access to public services and civil liberties in Indonesia. Its conceptual framework and methodology were informed by a scoping study conducted in early 2021. After hearing from 3,880 respondents to our quantitative survey in 34 provinces, carrying out 6 in-depth case studies, and engaging in deeper qualitative conversations with 82 informants and experts to explore critical cases and gain insights, we found some indications of how and under what conditions intolerance impacts access to public services and civil liberties. Some of our findings confirm previous studies in one way or another.

Our quantitative survey found some discernable links between intolerance and discrimination in accessing public service, although the level of discrimination captured was insignificant. Support for political Islam was revealed to be particularly important, which was most often found in conjunction with discriminatory attitudes toward women. Moreover, although limited in its scope, our qualitative study has shown where, when, and how the relationship between the two has taken place and could potentially take place again in the future and in other contexts.

Aligned with previous studies, we found similar trends and variations in intolerance on some issues. Among Muslims, most do not tolerate non-Muslims becoming public officials. Another high level of intolerance is towards the construction of non-Muslim houses of worship in one's neighborhood. Although the spillover intolerance to discrimination in public services is low, detailed disaggregation found that intolerance, support for political Islam, and sense of religious identity positively correlated to varying degrees with discriminative or restrictive views.

Our survey found that relatively few respondents perceived or experienced discrimination in accessing public services. In addition, only a small fraction of respondents agreed that the majority religious group deserves priority in accessing public services. The most prominent intolerant and discriminative attitudes found in our survey are those targeted at women. Most Muslim respondents agree that women who visit government offices should be required to wear the headscarf (*jilbab*) and that there should be a rule banning women from working at night.


The most cited reason for discrimination was one's economic status. People who perceived discrimination felt that public services were more accessible to the upper classes. This view was shared by both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents alike, although non-Muslims were more likely to cite other reasons, such as their religion or ethnicity. It implies that Muslims and non-Muslims may have different experiences of discrimination, but their most dominant experiences are still that of economic discrimination.

We found indications of self-censorship in the vast gap between the direct responses and the list experiment responses to whether the mosque loudspeakers in their neighborhood are too loud. We also found an indication of support for the repression of freedom of speech. A majority of respondents supported banning discussions on communism, atheism, religious violence and LGBTQ. There was no difference in whether the discussion was framed as academic or not.

As such, we cannot determine whether our findings reflect that access to public services is indeed inclusive or whether the public discourse on this particular issue is simply absent. It is also possible that people are timid to report discrimination or that the discrimination happens in another, invisible layer. This is because some experts we consulted indicated that there had been a kind of institutionalized or systemic discrimination that occurs beneath the surface and is often not captured by surveys or indices. This includes discrimination or favoritism in policy and everyday practices (beyond access to basic public services). These new forms of institutionalized discrimination are partly enabled by decentralization and an electoral system that encourages local political actors to win majority support by leaving minority groups behind. Our experiment found that support for discriminative policies is considerable.

In short, while the findings show that the magnitude of discriminative action in public services based on religious and ethnic reasons is reported as insignificant, a relatively high proportion of respondents reported agreement on limiting women's roles in public spaces and tighter control by the state on freedom of expression (a civil liberty) by banning discourse on sensitive topics. These findings indicate that there is still much work to be done in Indonesia for gender equity and freedom of speech and expression.

Thus far, the intolerance and discrimination observed above have been contained through counter-narratives, legal action, media advocacy, or personal action in filing a complaint. In many cases, the empowerment of vulnerable groups, networking among CSOs, and bridging between CSOs and the government have been instrumental to the effectiveness of stemming the exclusionary impact of intolerance. See the mind map on the next page for these major findings.



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## ANNEX 1 – QUESTIONNAIRE (IN BAHASA INDONESIA)

No. Kuesioner	:
Coret salah satu	Ganjil/Genap

### Survei Jejaring Sosial, Pelayanan Publik dan Toleransi Indonesia Tahun 2022

**PERKENALAN:** Selamat Pagi/Siang/Sore, Kami adalah pewawancara dari lembaga survei independen, Katadata Insight Center mengadakan survei "Survei Nasional Jejaring Sosial, Pelayanan Publik dan Toleransi Indonesia Tahun 2022". Partisipasi dan kesediaan I/B/S terhadap survei ini sangat kami harapkan sebagai bahan dalam penelitian kami. Seluruh informasi pribadi yang diberikan itu terjamin kerahasiaannya. Kami berharap I/B/S bisa meluangkan waktu sekitar 45 - 60 menit untuk menjawab survei ini. Jawaban-jawaban yang I/B/S berikan, nantinya akan menjadi masukan yang sangat berharga bagi pengambilan kebijakan di Indonesia.

Quality Control					
Nama Interviewer					
Waktu Interview	Tanggal :				Jam Mulai Wawancara :
	WITNESS	CHECK	CALLBACK	ENTRY	TANDA TANGAN RESPONDEN
Tanggal					Saya menandatangani kuesioner ini karena telah sesuai dengan hasil wawancara dan jawaban saya
Pelaksana					
Keterangan					

### KISH GRID

- K1. a. Berapa jumlah seluruh anggota keluarga yang saat ini tinggal di rumah ini yang berusia 18 tahun keatas? ... orang  
 b. Berapa jumlah anggota keluarga laki-laki yang saat ini tinggal di rumah ini yang berusia 18 tahun keatas? ... orang  
 c. Berapa jumlah anggota keluarga perempuan yang saat ini tinggal di rumah ini yang berusia 18 tahun keatas? ... orang
- K2. [Jika Kuesioner Ganjil = Tulis anggota keluarga laki-laki saja]  
 [Jika Kuesioner Genap = Tulis anggota keluarga perempuan saja]
- a. Tuliskan nama-nama anggota keluarga di rumah ini yang berusia 18 tahun keatas pada tabel di bawah ini.  
 b. Tuliskan kode hubungan keluarganya.
- |                        |                |  |
|------------------------|----------------|--|
| 1. Kepala rumah tangga | 4. Anak angkat | 7. Orangtua/mertua                       |
| 2. Istri/suami         | 5. Menantu     | 8. Pembantu/sopir                        |
| 3. Anak kandung/tiri   | 6. Cucu        | 9. Lainnya (famili lain, keponakan, dsb) |
- c. Tuliskan kode jenis kelaminnya. (L = Laki-laki, P = Perempuan)  
 d. Tuliskan umurnya.

No	Nama Anggota Keluarga	Hubungan Keluarga	Jenis Kelamin (L/P)	Umur (tahun)	[Ambil digit terakhir tanggal kunjungan pertama]												
					K2a	K2b	K2c	K2d	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2					2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3					3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3
4					4	3	2	1	4	3	2	1	4	3	2	1	4
5					5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3
6					6	5	4	3	2	1	6	5	4	3	2	1	6
7					7	6	5	4	3	2	1	7	6	5	4	3	2
8					8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	8	7	6	5	4
9					9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	9	8	7	6
10					10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	9	8

Selanjutnya, tarik garis mendatar pada nama orang urutan terakhir, kemudian tarik garis ke bawah dari nomor yang sudah dilingkari. Pertemuan garis tersebut menunjukkan nomor responden yang terpilih.

CATATAN :

DATA RESPONDEN TERPILIH (WAJIB DIISI DENGAN LENGKAP)				
Nama Responden				
Jenis Kelamin*	Laki-Laki (Kues Ganjil)	1	Perempuan (Kues Genap)	2
Alamat Tempat Tinggal	Jl. _____		RT: _____ RW: _____	
	Kelurahan :		Kecamatan :	
Provinsi	1. Aceh 2. Sumatra Utara 3. Sumatra Barat 4. Riau 5. Kepulauan Riau 6. Jambi 7. Sumatra Selatan 8. Bengkulu 9. Lampung 10. Bangka Belitung		11. DKI Jakarta 12. Jawa Barat 13. Banten 14. Jawa Tengah 15. DI Yogyakarta (DIY) 16. Jawa Timur 17. Bali 18. Nusa Tenggara Barat 19. Nusa Tenggara Timur 20. Kalimantan Barat 21. Kalimantan Tengah 22. Kalimantan Selatan 23. Kalimantan Timur 24. Kalimantan Utara	
	25. Sulawesi Utara 26. Gorontalo 27. Sulawesi Tengah 28. Sulawesi Selatan 29. Sulawesi Barat 30. Sulawesi Tenggara 31. Maluku 32. Maluku utara 33. Papua 34. Papua Barat			
No. Kontak Pribadi : (Kalau tidak punya, bisa nomor anak/keluarga/orang terdekat yg bisa dihubungi)				

### Sesi 1: INFORMASI UMUM

P1. Apa agama atau keyakinan yang I/B/S anut? [SA]

- |                      |                                      |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Islam             | 6. Kong Hu Cu                        |
| 2. Kristen Protestan | 7. Kepercayaan tradisional Indonesia |
| 3. Katolik           | 8. Lainnya, sebutkan _____           |
| 4. Hindu             |                                      |
| 5. Buddha            |                                      |

P2. Apa pendidikan terakhir I/B/S? [SA]

- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. Tidak pernah sekolah       | 6. Tidak tamat SMA/ sederajat                    |
| 2. Tidak tamat SD/ sederajat  | 7. Tamat SMA/ sederajat                          |
| 3. Tamat SD/ sederajat        | 8. Tidak tamat perguruan tinggi/ masih mahasiswa |
| 4. Tidak tamat SMP/ sederajat | 9. Tamat diploma atau sarjana                    |
| 5. Tamat SMP/ sederajat       | 10. Tamat program pasca-sarjana                  |

P3. Sebagai warga Indonesia, I/B/S lebih senang disebut bersuku bangsa apa? [SA]

- |           |           |                             |
|-----------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Jawa   | 5. Bugis  | 9. Bali                     |
| 2. Sunda  | 6. Betawi | 10. Banten                  |
| 3. Melayu | 7. Batak  | 11. Tionghoa                |
| 4. Madura | 8. Minang | 12. Lainnya, sebutkan _____ |

### Sesi 2: PERSEPSI TENTANG KEMUDAHAN DAN INKLUSIVITAS PELAYANAN PUBLIK

P4. a. Menurut I/B/S, seberapa sulit atau mudah proses pengurusan KTP sekarang ini? [SA]

- |                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| 1. Sangat sulit | 4. Sangat mudah                          |
| 2. Sulit        | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Mudah        |  |

b. Apakah pendapat I/B/S ini berdasarkan pada pengalaman sendiri, mendengar dari orang lain, dari berita di media massa, atau berdasarkan sumber lain? [SA]

- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. Pengalaman sendiri         | 4. Dari sumber lain, sebutkan _____      |
| 2. Mendengar dari orang lain  | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Dari berita di media massa |  |

P5. Menurut I/B/S, apakah proses pengurusan KTP dilakukan dengan inklusif atau dengan diskriminatif? Inklusif berarti dilakukan tanpa membedakan warga. Diskriminatif berarti dilakukan dengan memberi prioritas kepada warga tertentu, misalnya berdasarkan agama, suku, jenis kelamin, atau kelas ekonomi. [SA]

- |                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| 1. Sangat inklusif     | 4. Sangat diskriminatif                  |
| 2. Cukup inklusif      | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Cukup diskriminatif |  |

P6. [Diisi jika P5 = 3/4 (Cukup diskriminatif/Sangat diskriminatif)] Diskriminasi berdasar apa yang menurut I/B/S terjadi dalam proses pengurusan KTP? [SA]

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Diskriminasi berdasar agama           | 5. Diskriminasi berdasar hal lain, sebutkan _____ |
| 2. Diskriminasi berdasar suku            | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)          |
| 3. Diskriminasi berdasar jenis kelamin   |   |
| 4. Diskriminasi berdasar kondisi ekonomi |   |

- P7. a. Menurut I/B/S, seberapa sulit atau mudah proses pengurusan bantuan pendidikan bagi siswa kurang mampu sekarang ini? [SA]
1. Sangat sulit
  2. Sulit
  3. Mudah
  4. Sangat mudah
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. Apakah pendapat I/B/S ini berdasarkan pada pengalaman sendiri, mendengar dari orang lain, dari berita di media massa, atau berdasarkan sumber lain? [SA]
1. Pengalaman sendiri
  2. Mendengar dari orang lain
  3. Dari berita di media massa
  4. Dari sumber lain, sebutkan \_\_\_\_\_
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- P8. Menurut I/B/S, apakah proses pengurusan bantuan pendidikan bagi siswa kurang mampu sekarang dilakukan dengan inklusif atau dengan diskriminatif? Inklusif berarti dilakukan tanpa membeda-bedakan warga. Diskriminatif berarti dilakukan dengan memberi prioritas kepada warga tertentu, misalnya berdasarkan agama, suku, jenis kelamin, atau kelas ekonomi. [SA]
1. Sangat inklusif
  2. Cukup inklusif
  3. Cukup diskriminatif
  4. Sangat diskriminatif
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- P9. [Dilai jika P8 = 3/4 (Cukup diskriminatif/Sangat diskriminatif)] Diskriminasi berdasar apa yang menurut I/B/S terjadi dalam proses pengurusan bantuan pendidikan bagi siswa kurang mampu? Apakah berdasar agama, suku, jenis kelamin, kelas ekonomi, atau hal-hal lain? [SA]
1. Diskriminasi berdasar agama
  2. Diskriminasi berdasar suku
  3. Diskriminasi berdasar jenis kelamin
  4. Diskriminasi berdasar kondisi ekonomi
  5. Diskriminasi berdasar hal lain, sebutkan \_\_\_\_\_
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Seai 3: AKSES PEREMPUAN TERHADAP LAYANAN PUBLIK**

P10. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, setuju, atau sangat setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut:

Pernyataan	Sangat Tidak Setuju	Tidak Setuju	Setuju	Sangat Setuju	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Subsidi pendidikan seperti Kartu Indonesia Pintar sebaiknya lebih banyak diberikan kepada siswa laki-laki daripada siswa perempuan.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Ruang tunggu atau jadwal pelayanan di instansi pemerintah sebaiknya dipisahkan antara laki-laki dan perempuan.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Sebaiknya ada aturan yang melarang perempuan bekerja di malam hari.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Sebaiknya ada aturan yang melarang tenaga kesehatan (dokter atau perawat) laki-laki untuk menangani pasien perempuan, kecuali bila pasien perempuan itu ditemani keluarganya.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Di lingkungan sekolah, siswa laki-laki dan perempuan sebaiknya dipisahkan di ruang kelas yang berbeda.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Untuk menjaga kesopanan, perempuan yang mengunjungi kantor pemerintahan sebaiknya diwajibkan berjilbab dan berpakaian tertutup.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Sebaiknya diberlakukan tes keperawanan bagi perempuan yang hendak mendaftar jadi pegawai negeri sipil atau TNI/Polri.	1	2	3	4	5

**Seai 4: PERKIRAAN JARINGAN SOSIAL**

P11. Berapa banyak teman atau kenalan I/B/S yang beragama atau berkeyakinan sama dengan I/B/S? [SA]

1. Tidak ada sama sekali
  2. Sebagian kecil
  3. Beberapa
  4. Sebagian besar.
  5. Semuanya
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

P12. Berapa banyak teman atau kenalan I/B/S yang berasal dari suku yang sama dengan I/B/S? [SA]

1. Tidak ada sama sekali
  2. Sebagian kecil
  3. Beberapa
  4. Sebagian besar.
  5. Semuanya
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Seai 5: SIKAP UMUM TERHADAP PEREMPUAN**

P13. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, setuju, atau sangat setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Sangat Tidak Setuju	Tidak Setuju	Setuju	Sangat Setuju	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Perempuan sebaiknya mengurus rumah tangga dan menyerahkan urusan negara kepada laki-laki.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Kebanyakan laki-laki lebih cocok secara emosional untuk politik daripada kebanyakan perempuan.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Memiliki pekerjaan adalah hal yang baik, tetapi yang paling diinginkan oleh kebanyakan perempuan adalah membangun keluarga dan memiliki anak.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Mayoritas pelecehan seksual terhadap perempuan terjadi karena perempuannya memakai pakaian yang terlalu terbuka.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Pendidikan tinggi lebih penting diberikan kepada anak laki-laki daripada kepada anak perempuan.	1	2	3	4	5

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**Sesi 6: DUKUNGAN UNTUK DEMOKRASI**

P14. Secara umum, seberapa puas atau tidak puas I/B/S terhadap bagaimana demokrasi berjalan di negeri kita sejauh ini? [SA]

- |                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 1. Sangat tidak puas | 4. Sangat puas                           |
| 2. Kurang puas       | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Puas              |  |

P15. Menurut pendapat I/B/S, seberapa demokratis negara kita sekarang?

- |                                       |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Tidak demokratis sama sekali       | 4. Sepenuhnya demokratis                 |
| 2. Demokratis, dengan banyak masalah  | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Demokratis, dengan sedikit masalah |  |

P16. Apakah I/B/S sangat setuju, setuju, tidak setuju, atau sangat tidak setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut:

Pernyataan	Sangat tidak setuju	Tidak setuju	Setuju	Sangat setuju	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Demokrasi, meskipun tidak sempurna, adalah bentuk pemerintahan terbaik untuk negara kita.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Suatu sistem politik yang demokratis mungkin memiliki beberapa masalah, tapi ia tetap lebih baik dari sistem-sistem politik lain.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Demokrasi akan mengarah kepada kekacauan.	1	2	3	4	5

P17. Seberapa tertarik I/B/S dengan informasi tentang hal-hal yang terjadi di dalam pemerintahan dan politik? [SA]

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Sangat tidak tertarik | 4. Sangat tertarik                       |
| 2. Tidak tertarik        | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Tertarik              |  |

P18. Menurut I/B/S, seberapa jauh pejabat pemerintah peduli dengan aspirasi dan pendapat warga masyarakat seperti I/B/S? [SA]

- |                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| 1. Sangat tidak peduli | 4. Sangat peduli                         |
| 2. Tidak peduli        | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Peduli              |  |

**Sesi 7: JEJARING SOSIAL/PERTEMANAN**

P19. a. Dalam beberapa pertanyaan berikut, kami ingin mengetahui tentang jaringan dan interaksi sosial masyarakat Indonesia. Tolong sebutkan nama panggilan empat teman atau kenalan I/B/S yang berkomunikasi secara langsung dengan I/B/S setidaknya dua kali dalam 12 bulan terakhir untuk membicarakan hal-hal penting.

Dengan teman atau kenalan, yang kami maksud adalah orang-orang di luar keluarga I/B/S sendiri. Orang-orang ini bisa jadi teman kerja, teman sekolah, tetangga, teman organisasi, teman pergaulan, atau kenalan lain.

Nama 1: \_\_\_\_\_

Nama 2: \_\_\_\_\_

Nama 3: \_\_\_\_\_

Nama 4: \_\_\_\_\_

**PASTIKAN RESPONDEN TELAH MENYEBUTKAN EMPAT NAMA SEBELUM MENANYAKAN PERTANYAAN SELANJUTNYA. TULISKAN KODE JAWABAN UNTUK MASING-MASING NAMA.**

No	Nama Teman	Seberapa dekat hubungan I/B/S	Aqama teman I/B/S	Suku yang sama atau berbeda	Membicarakan isu-isu sosial, politik, dan agama	Seberapa berbeda atau tidak berbeda pandangan dalam isu sosial, politik, agama
	P19a	P19b	P19c	P19d	P19e	P19f
1						
2						
3						
4						

a. Nama teman/kenalan sesuai yang disebutkan responden di atas.

b. Seberapa dekat hubungan I/B/S dengan [Nama 1/Nama 2/Nama 3/Nama 4] tersebut? [SA]

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| 1. Tidak dekat sama sekali | 4. Sangat dekat                          |
| 2. Tidak dekat             | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Dekat                   |  |

c. Apa agama [Nama 1/Nama 2/Nama 3/Nama 4]? [SA]

- |                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 1. Islam             | 5. Buddha                                |
| 2. Kristen Protestan | 6. Kong Hu Cu                            |
| 3. Katolik           | 7. Kepercayaan tradisional Indonesia     |
| 4. Hindu             | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |

- d. Apakah [Nama 1/Nama 2/Nama 3/Nama 4] berasal dari suku yang sama atau suku yang berbeda dengan I/B/S? [SA]
1. Berasal dari suku yang sama
  2. Berasal dari suku yang berbeda
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- e. Seberapa sering atau jarang I/B/S membicarakan isu-isu sosial, politik, dan agama dengan [Nama 1/Nama 2/Nama 3/Nama 4]? [SA]
1. Sangat jarang atau tidak pernah
  2. Jarang
  3. Sering
  4. Sangat sering atau rutin
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- f. Secara umum, seberapa berbeda atau tidak berbeda pandangan [Nama 1/Nama 2/Nama 3/Nama 4] dalam isu-isu sosial, politik, dan agama dengan pandangan I/B/S sendiri? [SA]
1. Sama sekali tidak berbeda
  2. Tidak berbeda
  3. Berbeda
  4. Sangat berbeda
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 8: KESALEHAN ATAU RELIGIUSITAS**

- P20. Seberapa penting agama bagi hidup I/B/S? [SA]
1. Sama sekali tidak penting
  2. Tidak terlalu penting
  3. Cukup penting
  4. Sangat penting
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- P21. Seberapa sering I/B/S mempertimbangkan ajaran agama dalam mengambil keputusan-keputusan penting? [SA]
1. Tidak pernah
  2. Jarang
  3. Sering
  4. Rutin atau selalu
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- P22. [Diisi jika P1 = 1 (Islam)] Dalam beberapa pertanyaan berikut, kami akan membacakan beberapa aktivitas keagamaan. Seberapa sering I/B/S melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan keagamaan berikut? Apakah tidak pernah, jarang, sering, atau rutin/selalu? [SA]

Pernyataan	Tidak pernah	Jarang	Sering	Rutin/Selalu	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Melakukan shalat lima waktu	1	2	3	4	5
2. Berpuasa saat Ramadhan	1	2	3	4	5
3. Membaca atau mempelajari Al-Qur'an	1	2	3	4	5
4. Melakukan shalat di masjid	1	2	3	4	5
5. Mengikuti pengajian di lingkungan tempat tinggal	1	2	3	4	5

**Sesi 9: DUKUNGAN UNTUK POLITIK ISLAM [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam]**

- P23. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, setuju, atau sangat setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Sangat Tidak Setuju	Tidak Setuju	Setuju	Sangat Setuju	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Pemerintah harus memprioritaskan Islam di atas agama-agama lain.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Para pemimpin Islam (ulama) harus lebih berpengaruh dalam kehidupan politik.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Daerah-daerah di Indonesia harus diperbolehkan menerapkan hukum Islam/syariah pada tingkat lokal.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Hukum Islam/syariah harus diterapkan di seluruh Indonesia.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Penistaan terhadap Islam harus dihukum lebih berat.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Ketika ikut pemilihan umum, sangat penting untuk memilih pemimpin Muslim.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Islam harus menjadi satu-satunya agama resmi di Indonesia.	1	2	3	4	5

**Sesi 10: INTOLERANSI POLITIK**

P24. Dalam masyarakat kita sering atau biasa ada kelompok yang tidak disukai oleh kelompok lain. Di antara kelompok-kelompok ini, kelompok manakah yang I/B/S paling tidak sukai? [SA]

[Acak dan tunjukkan kartu bantu dengan nama-nama kelompok berikut]

1. Orang dengan agama yang berbeda
2. Orang Tionghoa
3. Orang tidak beragama
4. Ahmadiyah
5. Front Pembela Islam
6. Kelompok transgender (orang yang mengidentifikasi diri sebagai lawan jenis, misal pria yang mengidentifikasi diri sebagai wanita atau wanita yang mengidentifikasi diri sebagai pria)
7. Kelompok homoseksual
8. Kelompok lain, sebutkan ...
9. Tidak ada (jangan dibacakan)

P25. I/B/S memilih kelompok [jawaban P24] sebagai kelompok yang paling tidak disukai. Menurut I/B/S, apakah kelompok tersebut harus dilarang atau harus diperbolehkan melakukan kegiatan atau aktivitas berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Harus dilarang	Sebaiknya dilarang	Sebaiknya diperbolehkan	Harus diperbolehkan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Menjadi pejabat pemerintahan	1	2	3	4	5
2. Menjadi kepala daerah (misal, gubernur, bupati, walikota)	1	2	3	4	5
3. Mengadakan demonstrasi atau pawai di kota tempat tinggal I/B/S	1	2	3	4	5
4. Mengadakan pertemuan, rapat, atau seminar di kota tempat tinggal I/B/S	1	2	3	4	5
5. Menjadi guru di sekolah negeri	1	2	3	4	5

P26. [Berdasarkan jawaban P24] Menurut I/B/S, seberapa mengancam kelompok tersebut bagi nilai-nilai bangsa? [SA]

1. Sangat tidak mengancam
2. Tidak mengancam
3. Mengancam
4. Sangat mengancam
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

P27. [Berdasarkan jawaban P24] Menurut I/B/S, seberapa mengancam kelompok tersebut bagi keselamatan diri dan keluarga I/B/S sendiri? [SA]

1. Sangat tidak mengancam
2. Tidak mengancam
3. Mengancam
4. Sangat mengancam
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 11: INTOLERANSI BERAGAMA – MUSLIM [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam]**

P28. Ada berbagai pendapat di masyarakat tentang apakah suatu kelompok boleh atau tidak boleh melakukan sesuatu. Kami tertarik dengan pendapat I/B/S mengenai warga non-Muslim atau warga yang bukan beragama Islam. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak keberatan, tidak keberatan, keberatan, atau sangat keberatan bila warga non-Muslim melakukan hal-hal berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Sangat tidak keberatan	Tidak keberatan	Keberatan	Sangat keberatan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Warga non-Muslim mengadakan ibadah di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Warga non-Muslim mendirikan rumah ibadah di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Warga non-Muslim menjadi kepala daerah di daerah mayoritas Islam.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Warga non-Muslim mengadakan demonstrasi untuk menolak diskriminasi agama.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Warga non-Muslim menjadi kepala sekolah di sekolah negeri.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Warga non-Muslim menjadi Ketua RT di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Warga non-Muslim menjadi tetangga sebelah rumah I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5

P29. Apakah I/B/S mengidentifikasi diri sebagai Muslim Sunni, Muslim Syiah, hanya Muslim, atau yang lain?

1. Muslim Sunni
2. Muslim Syiah
3. Hanya Muslim
4. Bukan Sunni atau Syiah (Kelompok lain), sebutkan
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 12: INTOLERANSI BERAGAMA – NON MUSLIM [Diisi jika P1 ≠ISLAM]**

P30. Ada berbagai pendapat di masyarakat tentang apakah suatu kelompok boleh atau tidak boleh melakukan sesuatu. Kami tertarik dengan pendapat I/B/S mengenai warga Muslim atau warga yang beragama Islam. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak keberatan, tidak keberatan, keberatan, atau sangat keberatan bila warga Muslim melakukan hal-hal berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Sangat tidak keberatan	Tidak keberatan	Keberatan	Sangat keberatan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ ditunjukkan)
1. Warga Muslim mengadakan ibadah di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Warga Muslim mendirikan rumah ibadah di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Warga Muslim menjadi kepala daerah di daerah mayoritas Non-Muslim.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Warga Muslim menjadi Ketua RT di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Warga Muslim menjadi tetangga sebelah rumah I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5

**Sesi 13: IDENTITAS KEAGAMAAN**

**INSTRUKSI: PEWAWANCARA AGAR MENGECEK LAGI AGAMA RESPONDEN DI PERTANYAAN P1 DI ATAS.**

P31. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, setuju, atau sangat setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Sangat Tidak Setuju	Tidak Setuju	Setuju	Sangat Setuju	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ ditunjukkan)
1. Identitas I/B/S sebagai seorang beragama [agama responden] adalah bagian penting bagi diri I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I/B/S mengidentifikasi diri secara kuat dengan sesama orang beragama [agama responden].	1	2	3	4	5
3. I/B/S merasa dekat dengan sesama orang [agama responden].	1	2	3	4	5
4. Menjadi orang yang beragama [agama responden] adalah bagian penting dari cara I/B/S memandang diri I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I/B/S bangga dengan latar belakang [agama responden] I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I/B/S sungguh merasa menjadi bagian dari agama [agama responden].	1	2	3	4	5
7. I/B/S merasa dekat dengan orang-orang yang bukan beragama [agama responden].	1	2	3	4	5
8. Apa yang terjadi dengan sesama orang [agama responden] di negara ini akan mempengaruhi apa yang terjadi dengan hidup I/B/S.	1	2	3	4	5

**Sesi 14: SPEAKER MASJID 1 (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P32. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1.**

Saya akan membacakan beberapa pernyataan yang sering diutarakan masyarakat. Tolong sebutkan berapa banyak pernyataan berikut yang I/B/S setuju atau mewakili pikiran I/B/S. Jangan memberitahu saya pernyataan mana yang I/B/S setuju, cukup berapa banyak.

- a. Pembuatan KTP di tempat saya tinggal sudah bebas pungutan liar.
- b. Di RT saya banyak pendaatang baru yang membuat saya kurang nyaman.
- c. RT, RW, atau kelurahan tempat saya tinggal memungut biaya tidak resmi untuk pengurusan dokumen kependudukan.
- d. Warga lingkungan tempat saya tinggal jarang berinteraksi satu sama lain.

Berapa banyak pernyataan di atas yang I/B/S setuju:

JAWABAN: 0 1 2 3 4

**P33. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERNYATAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2.**

Saya akan membacakan beberapa pernyataan yang sering diutarakan masyarakat. Tolong sebutkan berapa banyak pernyataan berikut yang I/B/S setuju atau mewakili pikiran I/B/S. Jangan memberitahu saya pernyataan mana yang I/B/S setuju, cukup berapa banyak.

- a. Pembuatan KTP di tempat saya tinggal sudah bebas pungutan liar.
- b. Di RT saya banyak pendaatang baru yang membuat saya kurang nyaman.
- c. RT, RW, atau kelurahan tempat saya tinggal memungut biaya tidak resmi untuk pengurusan dokumen kependudukan.
- d. Warga lingkungan tempat saya tinggal jarang berinteraksi satu sama lain.
- e. Volume toa masjid atau mushalla di lingkungan saya terlalu keras.

Berapa banyak pernyataan di atas yang I/B/S setuju:

JAWABAN: 0 1 2 3 4 5

Sesi 15: AKSES PELAYANAN PUBLIK OLEH MINORITAS DAN NON-MAINSTREAM

P34. Terkait pelayanan publik untuk warga beragama Islam dan warga yang bukan beragama Islam. Menurut I/B/S, apa salah satu kelompok harus didahulukan ataukah keduanya harus diperlakukan sama ketika mengakses layanan publik berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Warga yang bukan Islam harus sangat didahulukan	Warga yang bukan Islam harus didahulukan	Warga yang beragama Islam dan yang bukan Islam harus diperlakukan sama	Warga yang beragama Islam harus didahulukan	Warga yang beragama Islam harus sangat didahulukan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ ditunjukkan)
1. Dalam pembuatan KTP	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Dalam pemberian sembako atau bantuan masyarakat miskin	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Dalam pemberian beasiswa atau bantuan pendidikan	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Dalam pemberian layanan kesehatan di Puskesmas	1	2	3	4	5	6

P35. Terkait pelayanan publik untuk warga pengikut Ahmadiyah atau Syiah dan warga yang bukan pengikut Ahmadiyah atau Syiah. Menurut I/B/S, apa salah satu kelompok harus didahulukan ataukah keduanya harus diperlakukan sama ketika mengakses layanan publik berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Warga Ahmadiyah/ Syiah harus sangat didahulukan	Warga Ahmadiyah/ Syiah harus didahulukan	Warga yang pengikut Ahmadiyah/ Syiah dan yang bukan pengikut Ahmadiyah/ Syiah harus diperlakukan sama	Warga yang bukan Ahmadiyah/ Syiah harus didahulukan	Warga yang bukan Ahmadiyah/ Syiah harus sangat didahulukan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ ditunjukkan)
1. Dalam pembuatan KTP	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Dalam pemberian sembako atau bantuan masyarakat miskin	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Dalam pemberian beasiswa atau bantuan pendidikan	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Dalam pemberian layanan kesehatan di Puskesmas	1	2	3	4	5	6

P36. Terkait pelayanan publik untuk perempuan Muslim berjilbab dan perempuan Muslim yang tidak berjilbab. Menurut I/B/S, apa salah satu kelompok harus didahulukan ataukah keduanya harus diperlakukan sama ketika mengakses layanan publik berikut: [SA]

Pernyataan	Perempuan Muslim yang tidak berjilbab harus sangat didahulukan	Perempuan Muslim yang tidak berjilbab harus didahulukan	Perempuan Muslim yang berjilbab dan tidak berjilbab harus diperlakukan sama	Perempuan Muslim berjilbab harus didahulukan	Perempuan Muslim berjilbab harus sangat didahulukan	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ ditunjukkan)
1. Dalam pembuatan KTP	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Dalam pemberian sembako atau bantuan masyarakat miskin	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Dalam pemberian beasiswa atau bantuan pendidikan	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Dalam pemberian layanan kesehatan di Puskesmas	1	2	3	4	5	6

Sesi 16: SIKAP TERHADAP DISKRIMINASI PEMERINTAH (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P37. INSTRUKSI: TANYAKAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1**

- a. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh mendahulukan murid yang beragama Islam dibanding murid yang beragama non-Islam dalam pemberian bantuan pendidikan? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh
- b. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh menolak memberikan layanan kependudukan seperti pencatatan KTP untuk warga pengikut Syiah atau Ahmadiyah? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh
- c. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh mendahulukan warga yang dikenal sebagai penghafal Quran dalam pemberian bantuan masyarakat miskin? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh

**P38. INSTRUKSI: TANYAKAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2**

- a. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh mendahulukan murid yang beragama Islam dibanding murid yang beragama non-Islam dalam pemberian bantuan pendidikan, bila tujuannya adalah untuk mengikuti aspirasi tokoh-tokoh agama dan masyarakat? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh
- b. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh menolak memberikan layanan kependudukan seperti pencatatan KTP untuk warga pengikut Syiah atau Ahmadiyah, bila tujuannya adalah untuk mengikuti aspirasi tokoh-tokoh agama dan masyarakat? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh
- c. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah boleh atau tidak boleh mendahulukan warga yang dikenal sebagai penghafal Quran dalam pemberian bantuan masyarakat miskin, bila tujuannya adalah untuk mengikuti aspirasi tokoh-tokoh agama dan masyarakat? [SA]
1. Tidak boleh 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
  2. Boleh

Sesi 17: BATAS KEBEBASAN BERBICARA (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

Menurut Ibu/Bapak, apakah diskusi atau seminar untuk membahas hal-hal berikut sebaiknya diperbolehkan atau tidak diperbolehkan oleh aparat keamanan:

**P39. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1**

Pernyataan	Harus diperbolehkan	Sebaiknya diperbolehkan	Sebaiknya dilarang	Harus dilarang	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Diskusi tentang ajaran-ajaran komunisme	1	2	3	4	5
2. Diskusi tentang ateisme atau ajaran yang menyatakan bahwa Tuhan itu tidak ada	1	2	3	4	5
3. Diskusi tentang aksi kekerasan dan terorisme yang berbasis agama	1	2	3	4	5
4. Diskusi yang menampilkan pegiat gerakan LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, dan transeksual)	1	2	3	4	5
5. Diskusi yang mengkritisi kebijakan ekonomi dan pembangunan Presiden Joko Widodo	1	2	3	4	5
6. Diskusi yang mengkritisi aksi-aksi kekerasan yang beberapa kali dilakukan anggota TNI/Polri	1	2	3	4	5

**P40. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2**

Pernyataan	Harus diperbolehkan	Sebaiknya diperbolehkan	Sebaiknya dilarang	Harus dilarang	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset tentang ajaran-ajaran komunisme	1	2	3	4	5
2. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset tentang ateisme atau ajaran yang menyatakan bahwa Tuhan itu tidak ada	1	2	3	4	5
3. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset tentang aksi kekerasan dan terorisme yang berbasis agama.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset yang menampilkan pegiat gerakan LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexul, dan transeksual)	1	2	3	4	5
5. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset yang mengkritisi kebijakan ekonomi dan pembangunan Presiden Joko Widodo	1	2	3	4	5
6. Diskusi ilmiah berbasis data dan riset yang mengkritisi aksi-aksi kekerasan yang beberapa kali dilakukan anggota TNI/Polri.	1	2	3	4	5

**Sesi 18: SPEAKER MASJID 2 (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

P41. Dalam masyarakat beberapa kali ditemui kontroversi terkait volume pengeras suara masjid yang dinilai terlalu keras. Menurut I/B/S sendiri, apakah volume pengeras suara masjid atau mushalla di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S terlalu keras, terlalu rendah, atau sudah pas? [SA]

1. Terlalu keras
2. Sudah pas
3. Terlalu rendah
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**P42. INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK URUTAN PERTANYAAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI. ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2
3. KELOMPOK 3

KELOMPOK 1 → TANYAKAN PERTANYAAN DI BAWAH DENGAN URUTAN #a, #b, #c.

KELOMPOK 2 → TANYAKAN PERTANYAAN DI BAWAH DENGAN URUTAN #b, #c, #a.

KELOMPOK 3 → TANYAKAN PERTANYAAN DI BAWAH DENGAN URUTAN #c, #a, #b.

- a. Seandainya ada tetangga I/B/S yang beragama Islam merasa pengeras suara masjid di lingkungan I/B/S terlalu keras. Menurut I/B/S, boleh kah tetangga tersebut meminta pengurus masjid untuk menurunkan volumenya? [SA]
  1. Tidak boleh
  2. Boleh
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. Seandainya ada tetangga I/B/S yang beragama Islam namun tidak pernah ke masjid merasa pengeras suara masjid di lingkungan I/B/S terlalu keras. Menurut I/B/S, boleh kah tetangga tersebut meminta pengurus masjid untuk menurunkan volumenya? [SA]
  1. Tidak boleh
  2. Boleh
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- c. Seandainya ada tetangga I/B/S yang bukan beragama Islam merasa pengeras suara masjid di lingkungan I/B/S terlalu keras. Menurut I/B/S, boleh kah tetangga tersebut meminta pengurus masjid untuk menurunkan volumenya? [SA]
  1. Tidak boleh
  2. Boleh
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 19: DONOR DARAH DAN DONOR ASI (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P43. INSTRUKSI: TANYAKAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1:**

- a. Seandainya I/B/S mengalami musibah dan memerlukan donor darah. Apakah I/B/S bersedia menerima donor darah dari Palang Merah Indonesia? [SA]
  1. Tidak bersedia
  2. Bersedia
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. [Diisi jika P43a = 1/tidak bersedia] Mengapa I/B/S tidak bersedia menerima donor darah tersebut? [OA]
- c. Seandainya I/B/S memiliki seorang anak bayi yang memerlukan ASI (Air Susu Ibu) tambahan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan gizinya. Apakah I/B/S bersedia menerima donasi ASI dari pendonor yang I/B/S kenal cukup baik? [SA]
  1. Tidak bersedia
  2. Bersedia
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- d. [Diisi jika P43c = 1/tidak bersedia] Mengapa I/B/S tidak bersedia menerima donor ASI tersebut? [OA]

**P44. INSTRUKSI: TANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2:**

- a. Seandainya I/B/S mengalami musibah dan memerlukan donor darah. Apakah I/B/S bersedia menerima donor darah dari Palang Merah Indonesia bila darah tersebut berasal dari orang yang berbeda agama dengan I/B/S? [SA]  
1. Tidak bersedia 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)  
2. Bersedia
- b. [Diisi jika P44a = 1/tidak bersedia] Mengapa I/B/S tidak bersedia menerima donor darah tersebut? [OA]
- c. Seandainya I/B/S memiliki seorang anak bayi yang memerlukan ASI (Air Susu Ibu) tambahan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan gizinya. Apakah I/B/S bersedia menerima donasi ASI dari pendonor yang I/B/S kenal cukup baik dan berbeda agama dengan I/B/S? [SA]  
1. Tidak bersedia 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)  
2. Bersedia
- d. [Diisi jika P44c = 1/tidak bersedia] Mengapa I/B/S tidak bersedia menerima donor ASI tersebut? [OA]

**Sesi 20: PEMUKA AGAMA DAN INTOLERANSI (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P45. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1.**

Berikut adalah beberapa pernyataan. Tolong sebutkan berapa banyak pernyataan yang mewakili diri I/B/S. Jangan memberitahu saya pernyataan mana yang mewakili diri I/B/S, cukup berapa banyak.

- a. Percaya bahwa bumi itu datar, bukan bulat.
- b. Senang membaca buku, koran, atau majalah.
- c. Percaya bahwa Amerika sungguh pernah mendaratkan manusia di bulan.
- d. Tidak peduli atau tidak tertarik dengan politik.

Berapa banyak pernyataan di atas yang mewakili diri I/B/S?

JAWABAN: 0 1 2 3 4

**P46. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERNYATAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2.**

Berikut adalah beberapa pernyataan. Tolong sebutkan berapa banyak pernyataan yang mewakili diri I/B/S. Jangan memberitahu saya pernyataan mana yang mewakili diri I/B/S, cukup berapa banyak.

- a. Percaya bahwa bumi itu datar, bukan bulat.
- b. Senang membaca buku, koran, atau majalah.
- c. Percaya bahwa Amerika sungguh pernah mendaratkan manusia di bulan.
- d. Tidak peduli atau tidak tertarik dengan politik.
- e. Beranggapan bahwa beberapa ulama belakangan ini lebih mengajarkan intoleransi daripada toleransi.

Berapa banyak pernyataan di atas yang mewakili diri I/B/S?

JAWABAN: 0 1 2 3 4 5

**Sesi 21: LISENSI MORAL (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P47. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN BERIKUT HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2.**

Berapa tokoh dalam dan luar negeri seringkali memuji masyarakat Muslim Indonesia sebagai masyarakat yang toleran. Sebagai contoh, sering ditemui warga Muslim menjaga gereja saat Natal. Selain itu, di Jakarta, Masjid Istiqlal dan Gereja Katedral berdiri bersebelahan-sebelahan sebagai salah satu simbol toleransi.

Apakah I/B/S pernah melihat atau mengalami sendiri toleransi warga Muslim terhadap warga non-Muslim di lingkungan I/B/S? [SA]

1. Pernah 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
2. Tidak pernah

**P48. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN BERIKUT KEPADA SEMUA RESPONDEN (BAIK KELOMPOK 1 MAUPUN KELOMPOK 2).**

- a. Menurut I/B/S, seberapa toleran atau tidak toleran masyarakat Muslim di Indonesia terhadap warga non-Muslim? [SA]
1. Sangat tidak toleran
  2. Tidak toleran
  3. Toleran
  4. Sangat toleran
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. Seandainya ada tokoh non-Muslim yang maju menjadi gubernur di provinsi mayoritas Muslim. Beberapa tokoh Islam menolak calon gubernur non-Muslim ini dan memintanya mundur dari pencalonan. Para tokoh ini beranggapan provinsi Muslim sebaiknya tidak dipimpin gubernur non-Muslim.
- Menurut I/B/S pribadi, apakah calon gubernur ini sebaiknya tetap maju dalam pencalonan atau apakah calon gubernur ini sebaiknya mundur dari pencalonan? [SA]
1. Sebaiknya tetap maju dalam pencalonan
  2. Sebaiknya mundur dari pencalonan
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 22: UJARAN KEBENCIAN : AKTOR (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**P49. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 1.**

Beberapa kali di masyarakat terjadi penolakan terhadap masjid Ahmadiyah. Beberapa tokoh masyarakat menilai Ahmadiyah menodai Islam dan karenanya menganjurkan warga untuk menyegel paksa atau bahkan merusak masjid Ahmadiyah. Menurut I/B/S, apakah anjuran beberapa tokoh masyarakat ini sebuah ujaran kebencian atau bukan ujaran kebencian? [SA]

1. Bukan ujaran kebencian
2. Ujaran kebencian
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**P50. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERTANYAAN HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2.**

Beberapa kali di masyarakat terjadi penolakan terhadap masjid Ahmadiyah. Beberapa ulama menilai Ahmadiyah menodai Islam dan karenanya menganjurkan warga untuk menyegel paksa atau bahkan merusak masjid Ahmadiyah ini. Menurut I/B/S, apakah anjuran beberapa ulama ini sebuah ujaran kebencian atau bukan ujaran kebencian? [SA]

1. Bukan ujaran kebencian
2. Ujaran kebencian
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 23: MAKNA DEMOKRASI DAN SIKAP INKLUSIF (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK PERTANYAAN MANA YANG HARUS DITANYAKAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN PERNYATAAN INI HANYA KEPADA RESPONDEN DI KELOMPOK 2.**

Ada berbagai pandangan tentang demokrasi. Salah satu pandangan menekankan demokrasi sebagai sistem pemerintahan yang menjamin hak warga negara. Dalam demokrasi, negara melindungi hak warga dari semua kelompok, baik kelompok yang banyak maupun kelompok yang sedikit. Dalam demokrasi, hak setiap warga negara dijaga dan dihargai meskipun mungkin hak tersebut ditolak oleh kelompok yang banyak (mayoritas).

**P51. INSTRUKSI: BACAKAN DUA PERTANYAAN INI KE SEMUA RESPONDEN (BAIK KELOMPOK 1 MAUPUN 2)**

Dalam dua pertanyaan berikut, kami ingin mengetahui pendapat I/B/S tentang apa yang seharusnya dilakukan ketika hak warga negara berbenturan dengan keinginan masyarakat yang lain.

- a. Seandainya di kota tempat tinggal I/B/S akan dibangun gereja. Panitia gereja sudah melengkapi semua syarat. Di sisi lain, masih ada warga yang menolak gereja dengan alasan Kristenisasi. Menurut I/B/S, apakah pemerintah sebaiknya memberikan ijin gereja? [SA]
1. Sebaiknya memberikan izin karena syarat-syarat sudah lengkap meskipun masih ada penolakan
  2. Sebaiknya tidak memberikan izin karena masih ada penolakan meskipun syarat-syarat sudah lengkap
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. Seandainya ada warga keturunan Tionghoa hendak membuka toko bahan pokok di RT I/B/S. Sebagian warga keberatan karena khawatir toko ini akan mengurangi pendapatan toko warga setempat. Sebagian warga lain tidak keberatan karena menganggap semua warga negara berhak mencari penghasilan. Menurut I/B/S, apakah warga keturunan Tionghoa ini sebaiknya diizinkan atau tidak diizinkan berdagang bahan pokok di RT I/B/S? [SA]
1. Sebaiknya diizinkan karena itu merupakan hak yang bersangkutan
  2. Sebaiknya tidak diizinkan karena ada penolakan oleh warga
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 24: AGAMA DAN TOLERANSI**

P52. Apakah I/B/S setuju atau tidak setuju dengan pernyataan berikut ini: "Beberapa ulama belakangan ini lebih mengajarkan intoleransi daripada toleransi." [SA]

1. Tidak setuju
2. Setuju
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

**Sesi 25: PERILAKU INTOLERANSI DAN EKSKLUSIF**

P53. Kami akan membacakan beberapa tindakan yang beberapa kali terjadi di masyarakat. Apakah I/B/S pernah berpartisipasi, tidak pernah berpartisipasi tapi bersedia terlibat, atau tidak pernah berpartisipasi dan tidak bersedia terlibat dalam tindakan-tindakan berikut? [SA]

Pernyataan	Tidak pernah berpartisipasi dan tidak bersedia terlibat	Tidak pernah berpartisipasi tapi bersedia terlibat	Pernah berpartisipasi	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Mengusir pasangan kumpul kebo (pasangan di luar nikah) yang tinggal di lingkungan I/B/S.	1	2	3	4
2. Membubarkan acara keagamaan atau ibadah warga beragama lain.	1	2	3	4
3. Menolak pembangunan rumah ibadah agama lain.	1	2	3	4
4. Memukuli atau mengeroyok pelaku kejahatan yang tertangkap.	1	2	3	4
5. Menolak pendatang beragama lain untuk tinggal di lingkungan I/B/S.	1	2	3	4
6. Menolak pendatang homoseksual untuk tinggal di lingkungan I/B/S.	1	2	3	4
7. Mengikuti demonstrasi menolak kelompok LGBT (lesbian, gay, biseksual, transeksual)	1	2	3	4
8. Meminta warga keturunan Tionghoa untuk tidak membuka usaha di lingkungan tempat tinggal I/B/S	1	2	3	4

**Sesi 26: PERTEMANAN DAN PERNIKAHAN (EKSPERIMEN, LIHAT LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN)**

P54. **INSTRUKSI: PEWAWANCARA AGAR MENGECEK KEMBALI AGAMA RESPONDEN DI PERTANYAAN P1 DI ATAS LINGKARI KELOMPOK ACAK TERPILIH :**

**ENUMERATOR BISA MELINGKARI SEBELUM TURUN LAPANGAN, TELITI KEMBALI & JANGAN SAMPAI TERTUKAR KELOMPOKNYA!**

1. KELOMPOK 1
2. KELOMPOK 2

**INSTRUKSI: LIHAT "LEMBAR EKSPERIMEN" UNTUK MENGECEK URUTAN PERTANYAAN KEPADA RESPONDEN INI.**

**KELOMPOK 1 → TANYAKAN PERTANYAAN DI BAWAH DENGAN URUTAN #a, #b.**

**KELOMPOK 2 → TANYAKAN PERTANYAAN DI BAWAH DENGAN URUTAN #b, #a.**

- a. Apakah I/B/S akan menentang atau menyetujui bila I/B/S memiliki anak dan anak I/B/S bersahabat sangat baik dengan seorang yang bukan beragama [agama responden berdasar P1]? [SA]
  1. Sangat menyetujui
  2. Menyetujui
  3. Menentang
  4. Sangat menentang
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- b. Apakah I/B/S akan menentang atau menyetujui bila I/B/S memiliki anak dan anak I/B/S hendak menikah dengan seorang yang bukan beragama [agama responden berdasar P1]? [SA]
  1. Sangat menyetujui
  2. Menyetujui
  3. Menentang
  4. Sangat menentang
  99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
- c. [Sesuai jawaban P54a] I/B/S menyatakan bahwa I/B/S [sangat menyetujui/menyetujui/menentang/sangat menentang] bila anak I/B/S bersahabat sangat baik dengan seorang yang bukan beragama [agama responden berdasar P1]. Tolong berikan alasan singkat kenapa I/B/S [sangat menyetujui/menyetujui/menentang/sangat menentang] bila anak I/B/S bersahabat baik dengan seorang yang bukan beragama [agama responden berdasar P1].  
Jawaban:

**Sesi 27: KEANGGOTAAN ORMAS (Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam)**

P55. a. Di bawah ini adalah beberapa organisasi sosial keagamaan yang ada di dalam masyarakat kita. Apakah I/B/S anggota aktif, anggota pasif, simpatisan (pendukung) tapi bukan anggota, atau bukan anggota dan bukan simpatisan dari organisasi-organisasi ini? [SA]

Ormas	Bukan anggota dan bukan simpatisan	Simpatisan (pendukung) tapi bukan anggota	Anggota pasif	Anggota aktif	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
1. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	1	2	3	4	5
2. Muhammadiyah	1	2	3	4	5
3. Persatuan Islam (Persis)	1	2	3	4	5
4. Front Pembela Islam (FPI)	1	2	3	4	5
5. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)	1	2	3	4	5

Ormas	Bukan anggota dan bukan simpatisan	Simpatisan (pendukung) tapi bukan anggota	Anggota pasif	Anggota aktif	TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)
6. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)	1	2	3	4	5
7. Persaudaraan Alumni 212 (PA 212)	1	2	3	4	5
8. Forum Umat Islam (FUI)	1	2	3	4	5
9. Majelis Rasulullah	1	2	3	4	5

b. Selain organisasi-organisasi di atas, apakah I/B/S adalah anggota atau bagian dari organisasi sosial keagamaan lain?

1. Ya
  2. Tidak
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

#### Sesi 28: PENGALAMAN POLITIK 2019

P56. a. Apakah I/B/S ikut berpartisipasi memilih presiden dalam pemilihan umum tahun 2019 lalu? [SA]

1. Ya
  2. Tidak
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

b. [Diisi jika P56a = 1/Ya] Siapakah calon presiden/calon wakil presiden yang I/B/S pilih dalam pemilihan umum tahun 2019 lalu? Apakah Joko Widodo – Maruf Amin atau Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno? [SA]

1. Joko Widodo – Maruf Amin
  2. Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

P57. a. Selain presiden dan wakil presiden, Pemilu 2019 lalu juga memilih anggota DPR nasional, anggota DPRD provinsi, serta anggota DPRD kabupaten/kota. Apakah I/B/S ikut berpartisipasi memilih partai untuk tingkat DPR nasional dalam pemilihan umum tahun 2019 lalu? [SA]

1. Ya
  2. Tidak
99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan)

b. [Diisi jika P57a = 1/Ya] Partai politik mana yang I/B/S pilih pada pemilu 17 April 2019 lalu untuk tingkat DPR nasional? [SA]

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)              | 9. Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo)            |
| 2. Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)     | 10. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)             |
| 3. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) | 11. Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)             |
| 4. Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)               | 12. Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)                   |
| 5. Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem)            | 13. Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)             |
| 6. Partai Gerakan Perubahan Indonesia (Garuda)  | 14. Partai Demokrat                                |
| 7. Partai Berkarya                              | 15. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)                     |
| 8. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)              | 16. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI) |

P58. Apakah I/B/S sangat tidak puas, tidak puas, puas, atau sangat puas dengan kerja Joko Widodo (Jokowi) sebagai presiden Indonesia saat ini? [SA]

- |                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 1. Sangat tidak puas | 4. Sangat puas                           |
| 2. Tidak puas        | 99. TT/TJ (Jangan dibacakan/ditunjukkan) |
| 3. Puas              |  |

#### Sesi 29: IDENTITAS RESPONDEN

D1. Pada tahun berapa I/B/S lahir?

D2. Apakah pekerjaan I/B/S? [SA]

- |   |                   |   |                                     |   |                        |
|---|-------------------|---|-------------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| 1 | Karyawan Swasta   | 4 | Ibu rumah tangga                    | 7 | Part time/Freelance    |
| 2 | Wiraswasta        | 5 | PNS                                 | 8 | Tidak/Belum bekerja    |
| 3 | Pelajar/Mahasiswa | 6 | Profesional (dokter/pengacara, dll) | 9 | Lainnya, sebutkan .... |

D3. Manakah dari pilihan berikut yang paling akurat mencerminkan *pengeluaran* rata-rata rumah tangga per bulan (untuk makan, minum, sekolah, transport, listrik, air, pakaian) TETAPI tidak termasuk tabungan, pembelian barang mewah/elektronik, cicilan rumah? [SA]

- |                              |                                |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Kurang dari Rp1.000.000   | 7. Rp6.000.001 – Rp7.000.000   |
| 2. Rp1.000.000 – Rp2.000.000 | 8. Rp7.000.001 – Rp8.000.000   |
| 3. Rp2.000.001 – Rp3.000.000 | 9. Rp8.000.001 – Rp9.000.000   |
| 4. Rp3.000.001 – Rp4.000.000 | 10. Rp9.000.001 – Rp10.000.000 |
| 5. Rp4.000.001 – Rp5.000.000 | 11. Lebih dari Rp10.000.000    |
| 6. Rp5.000.001 – Rp6.000.000 |                                |

#### D4 SAMPAI D7 DITANYAKAN UNTUK RESPONDEN BERAGAMA ISLAM (P1 = 1/ISLAM)

D4. a. [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam] Apa I/B/S pernah bersekolah di Madrasah Ibtidaiyah? [SA]

1. Ya
2. Tidak

b. [Diisi jika D4a = 1/Ya] Berapa tahun I/B/S bersekolah di Madrasah Ibtidaiyah? ... tahun

D5. a. [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam] Apa I/B/S pernah bersekolah di Madrasah Tsanawiyah? [SA]

1. Ya
2. Tidak

b. [Diisi jika D5a = 1/Ya] Berapa tahun I/B/S bersekolah di Madrasah Tsanawiyah? ... tahun

- D6. a. [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam] Apa I/B/S pernah bersekolah di Madrasah Aliyah? [SA]
1. Ya
  2. Tidak
- b. [Diisi jika D6a = 1/Ya] Berapa tahun I/B/S bersekolah di Madrasah Aliyah? ...tahun
- D7. [Diisi jika P1 = 1/Islam] Apakah I/B/S pernah mengikuti program pendidikan keagamaan di luar sekolah berikut: [MA]
- a. Pesantren kilat
  - b. Madrasah diniyah
  - c. Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an
  - d. Tidak pernah sama sekali

Bapak/Ibu, demikian keseluruhan survei kami. Terimakasih banyak atas kesediaan Bapak/Ibu membantu kami dalam riset ini.

Jangan lupa ucapkan terima kasih dan berikan gift kepada responden.

Minta Foto bersama responden dan tanda tangan di halaman depan.

**D8 ATAU D9 TIDAK DITANYAKAN KE RESPONDEN. ISI SESUAI PENGAMATAN.**

- D8. [Diisi jika responden perempuan] Bagaimana cara berpakaian responden? [MA, Diisi oleh enumerator, tidak ditanyakan ke responden. Lingkari semua jawaban yang sesuai.]
1. Tidak memakai jilbab
  2. Memakai jilbab. Rambut, wajah, dan mata tetap terlihat
  3. Memakai jilbab. Rambut tidak terlihat. Wajah dan mata tetap terlihat
  4. Memakai jilbab. Rambut tidak terlihat. Wajah hanya terlihat matanya
  5. Memakai jilbab. Rambut, wajah, dan mata tidak terlihat.
  6. Memakai rok
  7. Memakai celana pendek
  8. Memakai celana panjang
  9. Memakai kaos oblong (t-shirt)
  10. Memakai kemeja
  11. Memakai daster
  12. Memakai kebaya atau pakaian tradisional lain
  13. Memakai jaket atau rompi
- D9. [Diisi jika responden laki-laki] Bagaimana cara berpakaian responden? [MA, Diisi oleh enumerator, tidak ditanyakan ke responden. Lingkari semua jawaban yang sesuai.]
1. Memakai peci haji, kopiah, atau songkok
  2. Memakai topi kasual
  3. Memakai celana pendek
  4. Memakai celana panjang
  5. Memakai kaos oblong (t-shirt)
  6. Memakai kemeja
  7. Memakai baju gamis atau baju muslim (atasan saja)
  8. Memakai baju muslim panjang yang menutupi seluruh badan
  9. Memakai jaket atau rompi
  10. Tidak memakai baju atasan

Coret yang tidak sesuai :	Jam selesai :
	WIB/WITA/WIT
	Kode pos :
	Koordinat GPS :

## ANNEX 2 – SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Sex:

##	Sex	Target	Unweighted N	Unweighted %	Weighted N	Weighted %
##	Male	50%	1940	50%	1935.63	50%
##	Female	50%	1940	50%	1944.37	50%
##	Total	100%	3880	100%	3880	100%

Age:

##	Age Range	Target	Unweighted N	Unweighted %	Weighted N	Weighted %
##	<= 20	8%	245	6%	306.81	8%
##	21 - 25	13%	389	10%	497.11	13%
##	26 - 30	14%	488	13%	535.96	14%
##	31 - 35	12%	526	14%	477.72	12%
##	36 - 40	12%	573	15%	462.19	12%
##	41 - 45	10%	526	14%	392.28	10%
##	46 - 50	9%	428	11%	341.79	9%
##	51 - 55	7%	314	8%	260.24	7%
##	56 - 60	5%	212	5%	201.98	5%
##	> 60	10%	179	5%	403.92	10%
##	Total	100%	3880	100%	3880	100%

Religion:

##	Religion	Target	Unweighted N	Unweighted %	Weighted N	Weighted %
##	Muslim	87%	2972	77%	3391.10	87%
##	Non-Muslim	13%	908	23%	488.90	13%
##	Total	100%	3880	100%	3880	100%

Education:

##	Education	Target	Unweighted N	Unweighted %	Weighted N	Weighted %
##	No schooling	16%	191	5%	617.50	16%
##	Primary school	34%	771	20%	1308.83	34%
##	Middle school	18%	921	24%	691.36	18%
##	High school	25%	1581	41%	982.66	25%
##	College or more	7%	416	11%	279.65	7%
##	Total	100%	3880	100%	3880	100%

Province:

##	Province	Target	Unweighted N	Unweighted %	Wtd N	Wtd %
##	Aceh	2%	20	1%	69.83	2%
##	North Sumatera	5%	390	10%	197.90	5%
##	West Sumatera	2%	20	1%	73.71	2%
##	Riau	2%	30	1%	77.60	2%
##	Jambi	1%	20	1%	50.44	1%
##	South Sumatera	3%	40	1%	120.27	3%
##	Bengkulu	1%	10	0%	27.16	1%
##	Lampung	3%	40	1%	124.15	3%
##	Bangka Belitung Islands	1%	10	0%	19.40	0%
##	Riau Islands	1%	10	0%	23.28	1%
##	DKI Jakarta	4%	390	10%	166.85	4%
##	West Java	18%	200	5%	678.97	17%
##	Central Java	15%	160	4%	566.43	15%
##	DI Yogyakarta	1%	20	1%	54.32	1%
##	East Java	16%	390	10%	628.55	16%
##	Banten	4%	390	10%	166.87	4%
##	Bali	2%	20	1%	62.08	2%

##	Nusa Tenggara Barat	2%	20	1%	73.71	2%
##	East Nusa Tenggara	2%	390	10%	69.86	2%
##	West Kalimantan	2%	390	10%	73.74	2%
##	Central Kalimantan	1%	10	0%	34.92	1%
##	South Kalimantan	2%	20	1%	58.20	1%
##	East Kalimantan	1%	20	1%	50.44	1%
##	North Kalimantan	0%	10	0%	7.76	0%
##	North Sulawesi	1%	10	0%	38.80	1%
##	Central Sulawesi	1%	10	0%	38.80	1%
##	South Sulawesi	3%	390	10%	124.18	3%
##	South East Sulawesi	1%	10	0%	34.92	1%
##	Gorontalo	0%	10	0%	15.52	0%
##	West Sulawesi	1%	10	0%	19.40	1%
##	Maluku	1%	10	0%	27.16	1%
##	North Maluku	0%	10	0%	15.52	0%
##	West Papua	0%	10	0%	15.52	0%
##	Papua	2%	390	10%	73.74	2%
##	Total	100%	3880	100%	3880	100%